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Fix Docker state access for granted builds - #512
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Recovery implementation updateContinued the existing work on Verification (agent-reported)
Checks of pushed headOn |
[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for head
Local checks passed: tests (2648 OK, 1 skipped), validator, basedpyright. Security audit ran: no confirmed vulnerability. AC-1 (live Docker build) not verified. CI: 2 checks failed, 5 passed (details below). Findings, verification, security, CIFindings[REV-001] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizesPath: The The pre-authorization is loaded without a consent fingerprint: AGENTS.md says a review treats a visible change without its [REV-002] · low · open · - · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rulesPaths:
Example: with As a result, the probe verifies a different path from the one the stage uses. The logic is duplicated four times; one helper would remove the drift. [REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundPaths: The owner's decision on #507 limits the grant to Docker's state directory "and nothing else under Credential stores stay read-denied: the Codex rules are The precondition is the user's own environment, for example a direnv Acceptance criteria
Verification (executed in the review clone at
|
| Check | Command | Result |
|---|---|---|
| configured-test | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests |
exit 0, Ran 2648 tests in 623.991s, OK (skipped=1) |
| verify:validate-package | python3 scripts/validate-package.py |
exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)… |
| verify:unittest | python3 -m unittest |
exit 0, Ran 0 tests |
| verify:basedpyright | basedpyright |
exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes |
Security triage and audit
The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secrets or agent-configuration paths changed, and the PR has no labels. The reviewer's judgement activated the audit, because the change widens a sandbox grant's filesystem scope and the consent disclosure. The plan also marks the audit security_required. cc-security-review ran on e17bc9a.
- No confirmed vulnerability.
- Potential risk, informational: the grant can now write
~/.docker(cli-plugins/,config.jsoncredsStore, contexts). A stage can therefore leave code that the host Docker CLI runs later, outside any sandbox. The owner decided this scope on 2026-11-17 andscripts/grants.pydiscloses it. The Docker socket is already root-equivalent. - The probe's srt settings file is now inside a writable directory (
probe_directory). Only the toolkit's owndocker buildofFROM scratchruns there: hygiene only. - Paths in TOML
-cvalues are JSON-quoted, the argv lists are not shell-interpreted, and the probe tag comes frommkdtemp. No injection path found. - Persistent
docker_hostconsents are re-asked, because theeffectivetext changed the fingerprint. Thedocker.host_socket_accesspre-authorization is not re-asked (REV-001).
CI (head e17bc9a, read once under the parallel policy)
Run 44200790233 started after the push of e17bc9a.
| Check | State |
|---|---|
| Classify the change | pass |
| Skills, manifests, and Bash installer | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-1) | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-2) | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-3) | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-4) | fail |
| PowerShell installer | fail |
The cycle's CI gate decides what to do about the failures.
Residual risk
- AC-1 was not verified at runtime. Whether
docker buildof a bareFROM scratchsucceeds under the user's BuildKit configuration, and whether Codex accepts the extra filesystem entry, were inferred from code and the issue's reproduction, not observed. - A project
BUILDX_CONFIGoutsideDOCKER_CONFIGstays read-only by design, and the stage then reports that failure. - The
state_errorheuristic also matches socket errors under~/.docker/...(Docker Desktop). That only causes a harmless retry that keeps both errors.
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2
Finding history, verification, security and CI[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for [REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizesPath: The configuration key's page still described a [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rulesPaths: Added [REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundPaths: The shared resolver refuses a resolved path equal to or above the user's home directory, keeping this grant scoped to Docker state. Unit coverage checks both cases. The docs now state the limit; PA-47 classifies it as the owner's role contract. Verification (agent-reported)
Earlier full-suite runs exercised intermediate uncommitted versions and exposed the resolver bound and test-capture issues; those were corrected before the passing final run. The final suite ran on the committed tree. Security audit (agent-reported)
Checks of pushed headHead:
|
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2Resolve update — PARTIALLY_RESOLVED. REV-001/002/003 remain resolved; the existing fix commit is Findings, verification, security, environment, CI and historyFindingsNo finding status changed in this attempt. All three valid findings remain resolved by commit [REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes
[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules
[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundThe shared resolver rejects a path equal to or above the user's home directory; tests cover both cases. Verification (agent-reported)
The attempted Fix-delta code reviewReviewed the complete fix delta from trusted review base Security audit (agent-reported)
Checks of pushed headHead:
The parallel CI gate handles the two failures; this resolve stage ran no CI fix round. Previous review and resolution history[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for [REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundEarlier resolution receipt: ORCHESTRATION_RESULT (JSON)ORCHESTRATION_RESULT |
[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: BLOCKED for head
Local checks: configured-test not verified (stopped at the time limit, no failure seen); Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-004] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checksPaths:
On This contradicts the PR's own docs: The owner's scope decision is a fair reason to withhold the write. It is not a reason to cancel unrelated stage work. PA-47 classifies the bound as a role contract and describes it as "refuses a path", not as failing the stage. Suggested fix:
Evidence: code path read at [REV-005] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerPath:
The test fails on a machine with no Previous findings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizesThe [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rulesAll four consumers now call [REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundThe home tree and its ancestors are refused ( Acceptance criteria
Verification (executed in the review clone at
|
| Check | Command | Result |
|---|---|---|
| configured-test | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests |
unverified: the run passed the 600 s foreground limit, moved to the background, and the harness stopped it at its background limit (about 20 minutes in total). No E or F marker appeared before it stopped. Earlier runs of this suite took 624–637 s. This run was slowed because the other checks ran alongside it |
| verify:test-executors | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_executors.py" |
exit 0, Ran 205 tests in 15.443s, OK |
| verify:test-grants | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_grants.py" |
exit 0, Ran 23 tests in 0.023s, OK |
| verify:validate-package | python3 scripts/validate-package.py |
exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)… |
| verify:unittest | python3 -m unittest |
exit 0, Ran 0 tests |
| verify:basedpyright | basedpyright |
exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes |
Security triage and audit
The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secrets or agent-configuration paths changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit runs anyway, because the plan marks it security_required and the change widens a sandbox grant's filesystem scope. cc-security-review ran on 79079d5.
- No confirmed vulnerability.
- Informational: the bound refuses only
$HOMEand its ancestors. ADOCKER_CONFIGpointing at a sibling such as~/.sshor~/.configwould still become writable. That precondition is the user's own environment. - Informational: the persistent
~/.dockerwrites (cli-plugins/,credsStore, contexts) can leave code that the host Docker CLI runs later. The owner decided this scope, andscripts/grants.pydiscloses it. The Docker socket is already root-equivalent. - Symlinks are resolved before the bound check. TOML
-cvalues are JSON-quoted, and the argv lists are not shell-interpreted. No injection path found.
CI (head 79079d5, read once under the parallel policy)
Run 44285526567.
| Check | Required | State |
|---|---|---|
| Classify the change | no | pass |
| Skills, manifests, and Bash installer | yes | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-1) | no | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-2) | no | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-3) | no | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-4) | no | fail |
| PowerShell installer | yes | fail |
The cycle's CI gate decides what to do about the failures. Their logs were not read: gh run view is outside this stage's command table.
History
[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3.
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2
The resolver marked REV-001, REV-002 and REV-003 as valid and resolved in 79079d5.
[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2Resolve update — PARTIALLY_RESOLVED. REV-004 and REV-005 are resolved by Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checksUnsafe [REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerThe test now patches [REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizesThe earlier fix updates [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rulesThe shared resolver normalizes the environment, probe and Codex/Claude write rules; tests cover home-relative and relative paths. Fixed in [REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundThe shared resolver refuses the home directory and its ancestors; documentation and tests cover the bound. Fixed in Acceptance criteria
Verification (agent-reported)The stage's version-2 check results follow. {
"version": 2,
"conclusion": "not_verified",
"boundary": "required",
"checks": [
{
"id": "configured-test",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [],
"level": "test",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [{"exit_code": 130, "note": "Stopped and rerun after the final source edit."}],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": 2651}]
},
{
"id": "verify:validate-package",
"command": "python3 scripts/validate-package.py",
"executor": "claude",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [],
"level": "static",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
},
{
"id": "verify:unittest",
"command": "python3 -m unittest",
"executor": "claude",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [],
"level": "test",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": 0}]
},
{
"id": "verify:basedpyright",
"command": "basedpyright",
"executor": "claude",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [],
"level": "static",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
},
{
"id": "verify:test-executors",
"command": "rtk python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py",
"executor": "claude",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": ["AC-2", "AC-3", "AC-4"],
"level": "test",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime acceptance regression coverage",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [{"exit_code": 1, "note": "Initial test setup passed sandbox_grants to ClaudeAdapter; corrected and rerun."}],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": 206}]
},
{
"id": "verify:docker-docs",
"command": "rtk rg -n \"docker_host|DOCKER_CONFIG|PA-47|home directory|build-state|Buildx\" docs/host-permissions.md docs/routing.md docs/capability-parity-audit.md",
"executor": "claude",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": ["AC-5"],
"level": "static",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime acceptance documentation check",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
},
{
"id": "verify:diff-check",
"command": "rtk git diff --check",
"executor": "claude",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": false,
"criteria": [],
"level": "static",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "additional diff check",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
},
{
"id": "docker-host-boundary",
"command": "docker build and docker compose build in the granted Codex stage sandbox",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "cheap_coder",
"context": "sandbox",
"required": true,
"criteria": ["AC-1"],
"level": "boundary",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime acceptance boundary check",
"head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
"result": "unverified",
"cause": "The Codex sandbox probe could not exec docker: No such file or directory (os error 2); neither live build ran.",
"attempts": [{"command": "docker version", "executor": "codex", "exit_code": 101, "error": "Failed to execvp docker: No such file or directory (os error 2)."}],
"evidence": [{"command": "docker version", "exit_code": 101, "executed": null}]
}
]
}The full suite ran 2,651 tests, 1 skipped; the package validator passed; Post-change reviewThe accumulated diff was reviewed against Security audit
Checks of pushed headRead once for History[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2[REV-001] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes[REV-002] · low · open · - · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules[REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound[REV-004] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks[REV-005] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker |
[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI for head
Unchanged: REV-001..003 stay resolved. Local checks: configured-test passed (2651 OK, 1 skipped), plus validator, basedpyright and 15 Docker regression tests. AC-1 not verified. Security audit ran: no confirmed vulnerability. CI: 5 passed, 2 failed, including the required Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-006] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does notPath: The Claude probe adds When How [REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checksAll four [REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker
[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizesUnchanged since [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rulesUnchanged; [REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundUnchanged; Acceptance criteria
Verification (executed in the review clone at
|
| Check | Command | Result |
|---|---|---|
| configured-test | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests |
exit 0, Ran 2651 tests in 422.420s, OK (skipped=1) |
| verify:validate-package | python3 scripts/validate-package.py |
exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)… |
| verify:unittest | python3 -m unittest |
exit 0, Ran 0 tests |
| verify:basedpyright | basedpyright |
exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes |
| verify:docker-regressions | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -v -k DockerHostProbeTests -k docker_state -k claude_docker_grant |
exit 0, Ran 15 tests, OK |
| docker-host-boundary | live Docker builds in the granted Codex sandbox | unverified, see AC-1 |
A first targeted run with dotted module names failed to import (No module named 'test_support'). That was an invocation error, not a test failure; the discovery form above is the valid run.
Security triage and audit
The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secrets or agent-configuration paths changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit runs anyway, because the plan marks it security_required and the change widens a sandbox grant's filesystem scope. cc-security-review ran on f6d6df6, focused on the fix delta 79079d5..f6d6df6 (scripts/executors.py, tests/test_executors.py).
- No confirmed vulnerability.
- The REV-004 fix keeps the inherited
DOCKER_CONFIGbut grants no write to it, so a refused path widens nothing. - Informational, unchanged: a
DOCKER_CONFIGthat points at a sibling of home, such as~/.config, still becomes writable. Persistent~/.dockerwrites (cli-plugins/,credsStore, contexts) can leave code that the host Docker CLI runs later. The owner decided this scope, and the grant text discloses it. - TOML
-cvalues are JSON-quoted, and the argv lists are not shell-interpreted. No injection path found.
CI (head f6d6df6, read once under the parallel policy)
Run 44331323776.
| Check | Required | State |
|---|---|---|
| Classify the change | no | pass |
| Skills, manifests, and Bash installer | yes | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-1) | no | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-2) | no | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-3) | no | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-4) | no | fail |
| PowerShell installer | yes | fail |
The same two checks also failed on e17bc9a and 79079d5. The cycle's CI gate decides what to do about them.
History
[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
Verdict: BLOCKED for 79079d5. REV-004 and REV-005 were opened.
[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2
The resolver marked REV-004 and REV-005 as valid and resolved in f6d6df6.
[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2Round summary
Status: PARTIALLY_RESOLVED. Local checks pass. AC-1 remains unverified because this executor cannot find the Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes
[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules
[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound
[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checksUnsafe paths withhold only Docker's filesystem grant; Codex and Claude dispatch continue without the override. Regression test passed. [REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerThe test uses a temporary home and Docker config. Full suite passed. [REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does notThe Claude probe now adds the Docker config path only when it is a directory, matching dispatch behavior. Added Verification (agent-reported)
Agent-reported verification checks, schema 2: {"version":2,"checks":[{"id":"configured-test","command":"python3 -m unittest discover -s tests","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"test","provenance":"runtime","reason":"runtime","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":2652},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"docker-grant-regressions","command":"python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-2","AC-3","AC-4"],"level":"test","provenance":"runtime","reason":"AC-linked Docker regression coverage","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":14},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"package-validator","command":"python3 scripts/validate-package.py","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"static","provenance":"project","reason":"configured package validator","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"default-unittest","command":"python3 -m unittest","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"test","provenance":"project","reason":"configured default unittest command","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":0},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"basedpyright","command":"basedpyright","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"static","provenance":"project","reason":"configured type check","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"diff-check","command":"rtk git diff f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61..HEAD --check","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"static","provenance":"agent","reason":"fix-delta whitespace check","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"docs-acceptance-review","command":"rtk rg -n \"docker_host|DOCKER_CONFIG|Buildx|buildx|PA-47\" docs/host-permissions.md docs/routing.md docs/capability-parity-audit.md","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-5"],"level":"static","provenance":"runtime","reason":"AC-linked documentation coverage","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"docker-host-boundary","command":"docker build and docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-1"],"level":"boundary","provenance":"runtime","reason":"runtime Docker boundary check","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"unverified","evidence":[],"cause":"The Docker executable is unavailable: the stage sandbox probe failed to exec docker (No such file or directory).","attempts":[{"command":"docker version","exit_code":101,"error":"Failed to execvp docker: No such file or directory (os error 2)"}]}]}Security and fix-delta review
The delegated CI of pushed headHead
The previous Run history[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2Prior review finding: REV-006 was open at Previous rereview receipt: Current resolve receipt: |
[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: APPROVED for head
REV-001..005 are unchanged and stay resolved. Local checks passed: configured-test (2652 OK, 1 skipped), 14 Docker regressions, the validator and basedpyright. The security audit ran and found no confirmed vulnerability. CI: 7/7 checks passed. AC-1 is not verified: this stage cannot reach Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not
[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizesUnchanged since [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules
[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundUnchanged. The bound check still runs after [REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checksUnchanged. [REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerUnchanged. The test now asserts on the resolved temporary path, and it passes. Acceptance criteria
Verification (executed in the review clone at
|
| Check | Command | Result |
|---|---|---|
| configured-test | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests |
exit 0, Ran 2652 tests in 386.911s, OK (skipped=1) |
| docker-grant-regressions | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests |
exit 0, Ran 14 tests, OK |
| package-validator | python3 scripts/validate-package.py |
exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)… |
| default-unittest | python3 -m unittest |
exit 0, Ran 0 tests |
| basedpyright | basedpyright |
exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes |
| diff-check | rtk git diff f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61..HEAD --check |
exit 0, no output |
| docs-acceptance-review | git grep -n -c -e docker_host -e DOCKER_CONFIG -e Buildx -e buildx -e PA-47 -- <3 pages> |
exit 0. The frozen rtk rg form was refused (rg is not in the rereview table) |
| docker-host-boundary | live docker build / docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox |
unverified, see AC-1 |
Security triage and audit
The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secret or agent-configuration path changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit ran anyway because the plan marks it security_required. cc-security-review ran on eac57a3, focused on the delta f6d6df6..eac57a3.
- No confirmed vulnerability.
- The REV-006 fix narrows the Claude probe's write set. It widens nothing.
- Informational:
~/is now joined to the home path with pathlib. An input such asDOCKER_CONFIG=~//xtherefore resolves to/x, whereexpandusergave<home>/x. The env and the write rule still agree on that path, and the user's own environment could name it directly, so the grant gains no new exposure. - Informational, unchanged: a
DOCKER_CONFIGthat points at a sibling of home, such as~/.config, still becomes writable. The persistent~/.dockerwrites are disclosed in the grant text. The Docker socket is root-equivalent.
CI (head eac57a3, run 44343836377, read under the parallel policy)
| Check | State |
|---|---|
| Classify the change | pass |
| Skills, manifests, and Bash installer | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-1) | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-2) | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-3) | pass |
| Windows test shard (windows-4) | pass |
| PowerShell installer | pass |
The windows-4 and PowerShell installer checks that failed on earlier heads now pass.
History
[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
Verdict: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI for f6d6df6. REV-006 was opened.
[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2
The resolver marked REV-006 valid and resolved in eac57a3.
[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-005] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: APPROVED for head
Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes
[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules
[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundThe bound runs after [REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks
[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerThe test uses a temporary home and a temporary Docker config, and it passes. [REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does notThe Claude probe adds Acceptance criteria
Verification (executed in the review clone at
|
| Check | Command | Result |
|---|---|---|
| configured-test | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests |
exit 0, Ran 2652 tests in 484.215s, OK (skipped=1) |
| docker-grant-regressions | python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests |
exit 0, Ran 14 tests, OK |
| package-validator | python3 scripts/validate-package.py |
exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)… |
| default-unittest | python3 -m unittest |
exit 0, Ran 0 tests |
| basedpyright | basedpyright |
exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes |
| diff-check | git diff --check 54a83ad HEAD (stands in for the hashed frozen command) |
exit 0, no output |
| docs-acceptance-review | git grep -n -c … -- <3 pages> plus a read of the docs diff |
exit 0 |
| docker-host-boundary | live docker build and docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox |
unverified (see AC-1) |
Security triage and audit
The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secret or agent-configuration path changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit ran anyway because the plan marks it security_required. cc-security-review ran on eac57a3 over the full diff.
- No confirmed vulnerability.
- Codex
-cvalues are built withjson.dumps, and every probe and dispatch argv is a list without a shell. The probe tag comes frommkdtemp. - Changing the disclosure text also changes the grant fingerprint:
SensitiveGrant.fingerprinthashesscope.effective(scripts/grants.py:103). An earlier persistentdocker_hostanswer therefore becomes UNKNOWN and is asked again, as the docs state. - Informational, unchanged: a
DOCKER_CONFIGthe user sets to a sibling path under home, such as~/.config, becomes writable. Onlyos.environis read, not project files. The Docker socket is root-equivalent, and the grant text discloses this.
CI (head eac57a3, run 44343836377, read once under the parallel policy)
All 7 checks passed: Classify the change; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer; Windows test shards 1–4; and PowerShell installer.
History
[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
Verdict: APPROVED for eac57a3. REV-006 resolved.
[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-004] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e · schema:2Round summary: all 6 findings remain resolved; no finding status or disposition changed. The configured suite (2,652 tests, 1 skipped), 14 Docker regressions, validator, default unittest, BasedPyright and diff check passed. AC-1 remains unverified because this resolve dispatch is Claude, while the frozen boundary check requires the granted Codex sandbox. CI on Findings, criteria, verification and historyFindings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes
[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules
[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundThe bound runs after [REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks
[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerThe regression test uses a temporary home and Docker config. It passed in the prior rereview; unchanged this round. [REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does notThe probe only grants Acceptance criteria
Verification (agent-reported, head
|
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
configured-test |
Pass: 2,652 tests, 1 skipped. |
docker-grant-regressions |
Pass: 14 tests. |
package-validator |
Pass: 16 skills; shared sections and manifests aligned. |
default-unittest |
Pass: 0 tests collected. |
basedpyright |
Pass: 0 errors, warnings or notes. |
diff-check |
Pass: git diff --check against 54a83ad79d761b50a5bac9ad1d3ebcfdaeeedce5. |
docs-acceptance-review |
Pass: documentation search and review of the supplied diff. |
docker-host-boundary |
Not verified: no Codex dispatch was available in this resolve stage. |
The supplied accumulated diff was 893 lines and matched SHA-256 4c2d99549e5fa74bd2b315f26c14f7f3ef2a8a9997ef59d8f285850e88e8bfca. The latest trusted review head is the current head, so the fix delta is empty. No security audit was required by this plan (security_required=false).
CI (head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e)
All 7 checks passed: Classify the change; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer; Windows test shards 1–4; and PowerShell installer.
History
[CCR-20261118-005] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2
[CCR-20261118-006] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Verdict: APPROVED for head AC-1 ( Findings, criteria, verification, security, CI and historyFindings (unchanged this round)[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes
[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules
[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no boundThe bound is applied after [REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks
[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.dockerThe test uses a temporary home and Docker config, and passed again. [REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does notThe probe grants Acceptance criteria
Verification (agent-reported, head
|
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
configured-test |
pass: exit 0, 2,652 tests run, 1 skipped |
docker-grant-regressions |
pass: exit 0, 14 tests |
package-validator |
pass: exit 0, VALID: 16 skills |
default-unittest |
pass: exit 0, 0 tests collected |
basedpyright |
pass: exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes |
diff-check |
pass: git diff --check against the merge base exited 0 |
docs-acceptance-review |
pass: reviewed the doc hunks in the supplied diff |
docker-host-boundary |
unverified: Docker refused in this dispatch (see AC-1) |
Overall verification result: not_verified, because one required check could not run.
Security
Security audit ran (security_required). No confirmed vulnerability. Reviewed:
- the
DOCKER_CONFIGresolver and its home bound; - the Codex filesystem and
shell_environment_policyoptions, whose values are JSON-quoted; - the Claude
allowWritelist; - the Buildx fallback, which stays in the per-dispatch TMPDIR;
- the probe's build context, which holds only a fixed
FROM scratchDockerfile; - the grant disclosure. Its fingerprint includes the effective text, so earlier persistent consents are asked again.
Informational residual risks:
- With the grant, writes to
~/.docker(CLI plugins, credential helpers) persist and can run later on the host. This is disclosed, needs consent, and Docker access is already root-equivalent. - The bound covers only home and its ancestors, not other home subdirectories.
DOCKER_CONFIGcomes only from the user's own launching environment; repository configuration cannot set it.
Not a sensitive path under the mandatory minimum. The audit ran because the plan requires it.
CI (head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e, read once, parallel policy)
7/7 passed: Classify the change; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer; Windows test shards 1–4; PowerShell installer.
Refs #507
With
docker_host, a Codex stage can reach the Docker daemon, but builds fail when Buildx cannot update state under~/.docker. The probe checkeddocker version, so it reported reachability without testing the state write needed by builds.Diagnosis
The issue records a reproduction with
codex sandbox --permission-profile code_cycle_write:docker versionand Compose against an existing image pass;docker buildanddocker compose buildfail with a read-only Buildx activity directory; redirectingBUILDX_CONFIGorDOCKER_CONFIGto a writable directory makes the builds pass. The implementation code confirms the gap: the Codex stage profile grants workspace and dispatch scratch writes, while_docker_host_probeonly runsdocker version. The invariant is that a granted Docker operation must not be blocked by a narrower toolkit filesystem profile. This stage did not repeat the daemon commands because itsdocker_hostgrant is pending.Related work searched by Docker grant, state variables, probe and sandbox paths: closed #345, #398, #439, #450 and #493; open #509 also describes the Docker-state subcase of a broader sandbox-grant design. This change implements the Docker-state portion; #509's generic writable-path, local-socket and network grants remain outside this scope.
The fix adds the effective
DOCKER_CONFIGdirectory to Codex's writable profile only withdocker_host, preserves configuredDOCKER_CONFIGandBUILDX_CONFIG, and probes with a disposableFROM scratchbuild. If Buildx state writes are denied andBUILDX_CONFIGis unset, the probe retries with Buildx state in dispatchTMPDIRand records the fallback or the actual failure. The consent disclosure now names the persistent Docker configuration writes; a previous persistent grant needs acceptance again because its scope changed.Work units
WU-1scripts/executors.py,scripts/grants.py,docs/host-permissions.md,docs/routing.md,docs/capability-parity-audit.mdtests/test_executors.py,tests/test_grants.py, characterization fixtureVerification (agent-reported)
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests— passed, 2,647 tests, 1 skipped.python3 scripts/validate-package.py— passed.basedpyright— passed, zero errors, warnings or notes.python3 -m unittest— passed, 0 tests collected by this project's default discovery.git diff --check— passed.Boundary verification
AC-1's live
docker buildanddocker compose buildinside the granted Codex sandbox have not run: this stage has not received thedocker_hostgrant. The sandbox-profile regression test covers the grant and no-grant paths. The original issue's host reproduction is recorded above, but it is not this stage's execution evidence.Checks of pushed head
Agent-reported code-host checks on
9ad8298133d000c4e934c9cfa2f00fde89c63774:Classify the changepassed;Skills, manifests, and Bash installerand Windows test shards 1–4 were in progress when read. The cycle's parallel CI gate will wait for them.