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Fix Docker state access for granted builds - #512

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fix/507-docker-host-state-dir
Nov 18, 2026
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datacas merged 5 commits into
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fix/507-docker-host-state-dir

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@datacas datacas commented Nov 17, 2026 •

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Refs #507

With docker_host, a Codex stage can reach the Docker daemon, but builds fail when Buildx cannot update state under ~/.docker. The probe checked docker version, so it reported reachability without testing the state write needed by builds.

Diagnosis

The issue records a reproduction with codex sandbox --permission-profile code_cycle_write: docker version and Compose against an existing image pass; docker build and docker compose build fail with a read-only Buildx activity directory; redirecting BUILDX_CONFIG or DOCKER_CONFIG to a writable directory makes the builds pass. The implementation code confirms the gap: the Codex stage profile grants workspace and dispatch scratch writes, while _docker_host_probe only runs docker version. The invariant is that a granted Docker operation must not be blocked by a narrower toolkit filesystem profile. This stage did not repeat the daemon commands because its docker_host grant is pending.

Related work searched by Docker grant, state variables, probe and sandbox paths: closed #345, #398, #439, #450 and #493; open #509 also describes the Docker-state subcase of a broader sandbox-grant design. This change implements the Docker-state portion; #509's generic writable-path, local-socket and network grants remain outside this scope.

The fix adds the effective DOCKER_CONFIG directory to Codex's writable profile only with docker_host, preserves configured DOCKER_CONFIG and BUILDX_CONFIG, and probes with a disposable FROM scratch build. If Buildx state writes are denied and BUILDX_CONFIG is unset, the probe retries with Buildx state in dispatch TMPDIR and records the fallback or the actual failure. The consent disclosure now names the persistent Docker configuration writes; a previous persistent grant needs acceptance again because its scope changed.

Work units

Unit Behaviour Files Tests Verification Rollback
WU-1 Grant Docker state access with the Docker grant, probe build-state writes, and disclose the persistent scope scripts/executors.py, scripts/grants.py, docs/host-permissions.md, docs/routing.md, docs/capability-parity-audit.md tests/test_executors.py, tests/test_grants.py, characterization fixture Full unittest discovery, package validator, BasedPyright; live Docker boundary remains pending independent

Verification (agent-reported)

  • python3 -m unittest discover -s tests — passed, 2,647 tests, 1 skipped.
  • python3 scripts/validate-package.py — passed.
  • basedpyright — passed, zero errors, warnings or notes.
  • python3 -m unittest — passed, 0 tests collected by this project's default discovery.
  • git diff --check — passed.

Boundary verification

AC-1's live docker build and docker compose build inside the granted Codex sandbox have not run: this stage has not received the docker_host grant. The sandbox-profile regression test covers the grant and no-grant paths. The original issue's host reproduction is recorded above, but it is not this stage's execution evidence.

Checks of pushed head

Agent-reported code-host checks on 9ad8298133d000c4e934c9cfa2f00fde89c63774: Classify the change passed; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer and Windows test shards 1–4 were in progress when read. The cycle's parallel CI gate will wait for them.

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 17, 2026

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Recovery implementation update

Continued the existing work on fix/507-docker-host-state-dir and PR #512. Commit e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 adds the missing Claude sandbox write permission for the effective DOCKER_CONFIG directory when docker_host is granted, plus a regression test for granted and ungranted dispatches.

Verification (agent-reported)

  • python3 -m unittest discover -s tests — passed, 2,648 tests, 1 skipped.
  • python3 scripts/validate-package.py — passed.
  • python3 -m unittest — passed, 0 tests collected by this project's default discovery.
  • basedpyright — passed, zero errors, warnings or notes.
  • git diff --check — passed.
  • cc-security-review — ran; no confirmed vulnerabilities found. The disclosed Docker grant remains host-root capable and its configuration/state writes persist as documented.
  • AC-1 live docker build and docker compose build inside the granted Codex sandbox remain unverified because this branch has no docker_host grant. AC-2 through AC-5 have regression, probe, type, package, and documentation review coverage.

Checks of pushed head

On e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3: Classify the change passed. Skills, manifests, and Bash installer and Windows test shards 1–4 were in progress when read. The parallel CI gate will wait for them.

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 17, 2026

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[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for head e17bc9a. Diff 54a83ad...e17bc9a reviewed in full (8 files). 3 findings, 1 blocks.

  • REV-001 (medium, blocks): docs/configuration.md:121 still says the docker.host_socket_access probe is docker version. It also leaves out that true now pre-authorizes persistent writes under DOCKER_CONFIG. Fix: update that row the way routing.md and host-permissions.md were updated. Test: docs only.
  • REV-002 (low): the DOCKER_CONFIG value is resolved in 4 places with different rules. The stage env gets the raw value, while the write rule and the probe get the expanded path. Fix: one shared helper. Test: a relative or ~ value.
  • REV-003 (low): the DOCKER_CONFIG write has no bound. A value of $HOME makes all of home writable. Fix: refuse or report a path that is home or contains it. Test: unit.

Local checks passed: tests (2648 OK, 1 skipped), validator, basedpyright. Security audit ran: no confirmed vulnerability. AC-1 (live Docker build) not verified. CI: 2 checks failed, 5 passed (details below).

Findings, verification, security, CI

Findings

[REV-001] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

Path: docs/configuration.md:121.

The docker.host_socket_access row still says a "runtime docker version probe checks reachability". It does not mention that true now also pre-authorizes writes to DOCKER_CONFIG (~/.docker by default), and those writes outlive the dispatch.

The pre-authorization is loaded without a consent fingerprint: scripts/cycle_cli.py:276 and scripts/consent_control.py:32 call docker_host_socket_access(config). Persistent consents are asked again because effective is part of SensitiveGrant.fingerprint (scripts/grants.py:101-105). Configuration pre-authorization is not, so its owning page is the only disclosure the project owner gets.

AGENTS.md says a review treats a visible change without its docs/ page as a finding. The updated docs/host-permissions.md and docs/routing.md describe the new scope; the configuration key's own page was missed.

[REV-002] · low · open · - · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

Paths: scripts/executors.py:187-188, scripts/executors.py:673-677, scripts/executors.py:2339-2344, scripts/executors.py:3208-3215.

_native_review_scratch passes the raw os.environ["DOCKER_CONFIG"] to the stage. The Codex filesystem rule, the Claude allowWrite entry and the probe use the expanded (expanduser), cwd-relative, resolve()d path instead.

Example: with DOCKER_CONFIG=~/docker-alt, the write rule covers /home/u/docker-alt. The stage env still holds the literal ~/docker-alt, which Docker does not expand, so Docker writes under <cwd>/~/docker-alt.

As a result, the probe verifies a different path from the one the stage uses. The logic is duplicated four times; one helper would remove the drift.

[REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

Paths: scripts/executors.py:2339-2354, scripts/executors.py:3207-3215.

The owner's decision on #507 limits the grant to Docker's state directory "and nothing else under $HOME". The code grants write to whatever DOCKER_CONFIG resolves to. When that is $HOME, /, or a parent of other configuration, the whole tree becomes writable to the stage.

Credential stores stay read-denied: the Codex rules are "none" entries for the existing targets of sp.credential_read_denials. Shell profiles, ~/.config and ~/.codex/config.toml would still become writable.

The precondition is the user's own environment, for example a direnv .envrc. Suggested mitigation: refuse a DOCKER_CONFIG that is home or contains it, or report it in the probe record.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 live docker build / docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox not verified: this review stage has no docker_host grant and no Docker access. The argv and env are covered only by unit tests
AC-2 test_codex_dispatch_only_adds_docker_state_access_with_the_grant, test_claude_docker_grant_makes_config_writable, test_probe_uses_buildx_fallback_only_for_docker_state_write_failures (in configured-test) pass
AC-3 test_probe_keeps_build_failure_cause_when_buildx_fallback_fails, test_probe_keeps_a_project_buildx_config_on_state_write_failure (in configured-test) pass
AC-4 test_codex_dispatch_only_adds_docker_state_access_with_the_grant, test_codex_docker_grant_preserves_project_state_paths (in configured-test) pass
AC-5 the three named pages (host-permissions.md, routing.md, PA-47 rows in capability-parity-audit.md) pass by inspection; see REV-001 for configuration.md

Verification (executed in the review clone at e17bc9a)

Check Command Result
configured-test python3 -m unittest discover -s tests exit 0, Ran 2648 tests in 623.991s, OK (skipped=1)
verify:validate-package python3 scripts/validate-package.py exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)…
verify:unittest python3 -m unittest exit 0, Ran 0 tests
verify:basedpyright basedpyright exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes

Security triage and audit

The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secrets or agent-configuration paths changed, and the PR has no labels. The reviewer's judgement activated the audit, because the change widens a sandbox grant's filesystem scope and the consent disclosure. The plan also marks the audit security_required. cc-security-review ran on e17bc9a.

  • No confirmed vulnerability.
  • Potential risk, informational: the grant can now write ~/.docker (cli-plugins/, config.json credsStore, contexts). A stage can therefore leave code that the host Docker CLI runs later, outside any sandbox. The owner decided this scope on 2026-11-17 and scripts/grants.py discloses it. The Docker socket is already root-equivalent.
  • The probe's srt settings file is now inside a writable directory (probe_directory). Only the toolkit's own docker build of FROM scratch runs there: hygiene only.
  • Paths in TOML -c values are JSON-quoted, the argv lists are not shell-interpreted, and the probe tag comes from mkdtemp. No injection path found.
  • Persistent docker_host consents are re-asked, because the effective text changed the fingerprint. The docker.host_socket_access pre-authorization is not re-asked (REV-001).

CI (head e17bc9a, read once under the parallel policy)

Run 44200790233 started after the push of e17bc9a.

Check State
Classify the change pass
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer pass
Windows test shard (windows-1) pass
Windows test shard (windows-2) pass
Windows test shard (windows-3) pass
Windows test shard (windows-4) fail
PowerShell installer fail

The cycle's CI gate decides what to do about the failures.

Residual risk

  • AC-1 was not verified at runtime. Whether docker build of a bare FROM scratch succeeds under the user's BuildKit configuration, and whether Codex accepts the extra filesystem entry, were inferred from code and the issue's reproduction, not observed.
  • A project BUILDX_CONFIG outside DOCKER_CONFIG stays read-only by design, and the stage then reports that failure.
  • The state_error heuristic also matches socket errors under ~/.docker/... (Docker Desktop). That only causes a harmless retry that keeps both errors.

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

  • REV-001: resolved — docs/configuration.md now discloses the persistent DOCKER_CONFIG writes and build-state probe.
  • REV-002: resolved — one resolver normalizes ~ and relative paths for the environment, probe and both executor write rules.
  • REV-003: resolved — home-directory and ancestor paths are refused; docs and tests cover the bound.
  • Verification (agent-reported): 2,650 tests passed (1 skipped); package validator, BasedPyright, default unittest command and diff check passed.
  • Security: audit ran; no confirmed vulnerabilities. Docker state writes remain persistent and may include contexts, plugins and credential-helper settings.
  • AC-1: open — live Codex Docker builds were not run because this dispatch has no docker_host grant. This stage is blocked pending that grant.
  • CI: 2 checks pending on 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be.
Finding history, verification, security and CI

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3. Three findings, one blocking.

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

Path: docs/configuration.md:121.

The configuration key's page still described a docker version reachability probe and omitted persistent writes to DOCKER_CONFIG. Updated the row to disclose the write scope, the home-directory bound and the docker build probe.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

Paths: scripts/executors.py.

Added _effective_docker_config_path and used it for the dispatched environment, Codex filesystem rule, Claude write rule and sandbox probe. Regression coverage confirms ~/... and cwd-relative values resolve to the same path in the environment and probe/write rules.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

Paths: scripts/executors.py, docs/host-permissions.md, docs/routing.md, docs/configuration.md, docs/capability-parity-audit.md.

The shared resolver refuses a resolved path equal to or above the user's home directory, keeping this grant scoped to Docker state. Unit coverage checks both cases. The docs now state the limit; PA-47 classifies it as the owner's role contract.

Verification (agent-reported)

Check Result
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests pass; 2,650 tests, 1 skipped
python3 scripts/validate-package.py pass
python3 -m unittest pass; 0 tests collected
basedpyright pass; 0 errors, warnings or notes
rtk git diff --check pass
Fix-delta code review no remaining actionable findings; its test-capture finding was fixed
AC-1 live Codex docker build and docker compose build unverified; no docker_host grant was present, so the commands were not attempted

Earlier full-suite runs exercised intermediate uncommitted versions and exposed the resolver bound and test-capture issues; those were corrected before the passing final run. The final suite ran on the committed tree.

Security audit (agent-reported)

cc-security-review ran on the final fix delta. No confirmed vulnerabilities were found. Residual risk: the authorized Docker state directory can contain persistent contexts, plugins and credential-helper configuration; the grant disclosure names these writes.

Checks of pushed head

Head: 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be.

Check State
Classify the change pending
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer pending

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

Resolve update — PARTIALLY_RESOLVED. REV-001/002/003 remain resolved; the existing fix commit is 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be, and the fix-delta review found no new actionable issue. The configured suite (2,650 tests, 1 skipped), package validator, BasedPyright, default unittest command and diff check passed. Security audit ran; no confirmed vulnerability was found. AC-1 remains open: Codex sandbox startup failed before Docker ran with the nested app-server socket limitation. Checks on this head: 5 passed, 2 failed (PowerShell installer; Windows test shard 4); the parallel CI gate handles those failures.

Findings, verification, security, environment, CI and history

Findings

No finding status changed in this attempt. All three valid findings remain resolved by commit 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be.

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

docs/configuration.md now describes the persistent writes to the resolved DOCKER_CONFIG, its home-directory bound, and the build-state probe. Documentation review passed.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

scripts/executors.py now uses _effective_docker_config_path for the stage environment, probe, and Codex and Claude write rules. The suite covers ~ and relative paths matching across these consumers; configured-test passed.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

The shared resolver rejects a path equal to or above the user's home directory; tests cover both cases. docs/host-permissions.md, docs/routing.md, docs/configuration.md, and PA-47 in docs/capability-parity-audit.md describe the bound. Configured-test and documentation review passed.

Verification (agent-reported)

Check Result
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests pass; 2,650 tests, 1 skipped
python3 scripts/validate-package.py pass
python3 -m unittest pass; 0 tests collected
basedpyright pass; 0 errors, warnings or notes
rtk git diff --check pass
Fix-delta code review (e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3..79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be) no new actionable findings
AC-1: Codex sandbox docker build and docker compose build unverified; sandbox stopped before Docker ran with app-server socket directory must be a user-owned directory with mode 0700
AC-2 through AC-5 pass by regression suite and documentation review; AC-1 remains open

The attempted codex sandbox ... -- docker build returned exit 1 before Docker execution. docs/routing.md records this nested Codex CLI limitation. The second live build command was not launched after the same sandbox startup failure. The registered grant is for codex/linux; this Claude resolve dispatch did not substitute another executor or claim the Docker boundary passed. The project-wide unittest suite ran in this resolve dispatch; no CI or separate executor result is counted as local test evidence.

Fix-delta code review

Reviewed the complete fix delta from trusted review base e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 to head 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be. The shared resolver normalizes the effective path and prevents granting the home tree. Its dispatch, probe, and sandbox-policy call sites agree; regression coverage verifies ~, relative paths, and rejected home/ancestor paths. No new correctness, regression, or coverage finding remains.

Security audit (agent-reported)

security_audit_ran=true. The changed trust boundary is the persistent Docker configuration write combined with the host Docker socket. No confirmed vulnerability was found. Residual risk: Docker state can contain contexts, plugins and credential-helper settings, and the Docker daemon is host-root capable; the consent disclosure documents those persistent writes. Home and ancestor paths are rejected.

Checks of pushed head

Head: 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be (branch upload confirmed; already current on PR 512).

Check State
Classify the change pass
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer pass
Windows test shard (windows-1) pass
Windows test shard (windows-2) pass
Windows test shard (windows-3) pass
PowerShell installer fail
Windows test shard (windows-4) fail

The parallel CI gate handles the two failures; this resolve stage ran no CI fix round.

Previous review and resolution history

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3. The reviewer reported REV-001, REV-002 and REV-003 as open; dispositions were recorded as valid. REV-001 was medium and blocking; REV-002 and REV-003 were low and non-blocking.

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

Earlier resolution receipt:

ORCHESTRATION_RESULT (JSON)

ORCHESTRATION_RESULT
{
"skill": "cc-resolve-comments",
"status": "PARTIALLY_RESOLVED",
"issue_provider": "github",
"issue_id": "507",
"code_host": "github",
"change_request_id": "512",
"change_request_url": "#512",
"pr_number": 512,
"issue_number": 507,
"comment_url": "#512",
"previous_head_sha": "79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be",
"head_sha": "79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be",
"triage_run_id": "CCT-20261118-001",
"triaged_sha": "e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3",
"finding_outcomes": [
{"id":"REV-001","disposition":"valid","status":"resolved"},
{"id":"REV-002","disposition":"valid","status":"resolved"},
{"id":"REV-003","disposition":"valid","status":"resolved"}
],
"resolved_findings": [
{"id":"REV-001","status":"resolved","commit_sha":"79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be"},
{"id":"REV-002","status":"resolved","commit_sha":"79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be"},
{"id":"REV-003","status":"resolved","commit_sha":"79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be"}
],
"unresolved_findings": [],
"plan_id": "plan-cycle-947675efea8d4c799646b1f9c4a0afdc",
"revision": 22,
"digest": "f1b2df38680a1402d516e5a2d74afd0543a060859ae8db991867981549c18d44",
"security_audit_ran": true,
"tests": {
"version": 2,
"ran": true,
"conclusion": "not_verified",
"boundary": "required",
"evidence": [
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{"level":"test","command":"python3 scripts/validate-package.py","exit_code":0,"executed":1},
{"level":"test","command":"python3 -m unittest","exit_code":0,"executed":0},
{"level":"static","command":"basedpyright","exit_code":0,"executed":null},
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],
"checks": [
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},
{
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},
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},
{
"id":"docs-acceptance-review","command":"Manual review of docs/host-permissions.md, docs/routing.md and docs/capability-parity-audit.md PA-47","executor":"claude","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-5"],"level":"review","provenance":"runtime","reason":"acceptance criterion documentation review","head_sha":"79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":null,"executed":1},"cause":null,"attempts":[]
},
{
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},
{
"id":"codex-compose-build","command":"codex sandbox --permission-profile code_cycle_write ... -- docker compose -f /tmp/code-cycle-tmp-yd2_kg6d/docker-smoke/compose.yaml build","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"boundary","required":true,"criteria":["AC-1"],"level":"test","provenance":"runtime","reason":"live Codex Compose build boundary","head_sha":"79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be","result":"unverified","evidence":{"exit_code":null,"executed":0},"cause":"Not launched after the same nested Codex sandbox startup failure blocked docker build; Compose was not executed","attempts":[]
}
]
},
"checks": {
"head_sha":"79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be",
"passed":5,
"failed":2,
"pending":0,
"items":[
{"name":"Classify the change","state":"pass"},
{"name":"Skills, manifests, and Bash installer","state":"pass"},
{"name":"Windows test shard (windows-1)","state":"pass"},
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{"name":"Windows test shard (windows-3)","state":"pass"},
{"name":"PowerShell installer","state":"fail"},
{"name":"Windows test shard (windows-4)","state":"fail"}
]
},
"blocking": false
}
END_ORCHESTRATION_RESULT

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: BLOCKED for head 79079d5: the configured suite did not finish within the stage time limit. Full diff 54a83ad...79079d5 rereviewed (9 files). 1 new finding blocks.

  • REV-001 resolved: docs/configuration.md now discloses the DOCKER_CONFIG writes and the build probe.
  • REV-002 resolved: one resolver feeds the env, probe and both write rules; its test passes.
  • REV-003 resolved: home and its ancestors are refused, but that refusal causes REV-004.
  • REV-004 (medium, blocks): a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage, not only Docker. Fix: drop the write and DOCKER_CONFIG override, keep the probe's not_verified. Test: dispatch with DOCKER_CONFIG=$HOME.
  • REV-005 (low): a publishing-review test depends on the host's ~/.docker. Fix: patch Path.home.

Local checks: configured-test not verified (stopped at the time limit, no failure seen); test_executors and test_grants, validator and basedpyright passed. Security audit ran: no confirmed vulnerability. AC-1 not verified. CI: 5 passed, 2 failed (details below).

Findings, verification, security, CI and history

Findings

[REV-004] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

Paths: scripts/executors.py:157-168, scripts/executors.py:202, scripts/executors.py:2352-2353, scripts/executors.py:3217-3218, scripts/executors.py:1598-1606.

_effective_docker_config_path raises ExecutorError when DOCKER_CONFIG resolves to $HOME or one of its ancestors. Only _docker_host_probe catches it. That path returns not_verified and appends task text: "Continue independent implementation and checks". The dispatch then calls the same resolver three more times without handling the error:

  • Codex: CodexAdapter.argv raises at executors.py:2353. NativeAdapter.dispatch builds argv at executors.py:1598-1606, outside any try, so the ExecutorError escapes dispatch and no DispatchResult is returned.
  • Claude: policy_files (executors.py:3218) and _native_review_scratch (executors.py:202) raise inside the try. The except Exception at executors.py:1721 turns that into DispatchOutcome.FAILED, error_code="executor_error".

On main, the same configuration with docker_host dispatches the stage, and only Docker state writes stay read-only. With this change, the stage does not run at all.

This contradicts the PR's own docs: host-permissions.md says other failures "leave Docker-dependent checks not_verified and let independent work continue". It also contradicts the probe's instruction to the agent. Under AGENTS.md, a toolkit rule that turns an executable stage into a failure is a toolkit veto.

The owner's scope decision is a fair reason to withhold the write. It is not a reason to cancel unrelated stage work. PA-47 classifies the bound as a role contract and describes it as "refuses a path", not as failing the stage.

Suggested fix:

  • When the path is refused, add no write rule and no DOCKER_CONFIG override.
  • Keep the probe's not_verified record so the stage reports Docker checks as not_verified and continues.
  • Add a regression test that dispatches Codex and Claude with docker_host and DOCKER_CONFIG=$HOME and expects a launched stage.

Evidence: code path read at 79079d5. The existing test test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent covers only the resolver, not dispatch. A runtime reproduction script could not run in this stage: writing a helper under $TMPDIR was refused by the rereview command table ([layer=toolkit_hook], edit_rule).

[REV-005] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

Path: tests/test_executors.py:3255-3276.

test_a_granted_publishing_review_keeps_docker_state_and_scratch_grants expects a write entry for the real Path.home() / ".docker". It also expects exactly 2 ="write" entries. CodexAdapter.argv adds that entry only when _effective_docker_config_path(cwd).is_dir() (executors.py:2354).

The test fails on a machine with no ~/.docker, or where DOCKER_CONFIG points elsewhere, for example a fresh CI runner or a developer without Docker. The neighbouring new tests patch executors.Path.home and DOCKER_CONFIG; this one should too.

Previous findings

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

The docker.host_socket_access row now names the persistent writes to the resolved DOCKER_CONFIG, the home bound and the docker build probe. Verified by reading docs/configuration.md:121 at 79079d5.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

All four consumers now call _effective_docker_config_path: env (executors.py:202), probe (:688), Codex write rule (:2353) and Claude write rule (:3218). test_docker_config_resolution_matches_dispatch_and_probe covers ~/… and relative values; it passed in the targeted test_executors.py run.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

The home tree and its ancestors are refused (executors.py:165-168); test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent covers both. The way that refusal propagates is tracked separately as REV-004.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 live docker build / docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox not verified: this Claude rereview stage cannot start codex sandbox (the known nested-Codex limitation), and no Codex-executor run is available
AC-2 test_codex_dispatch_only_adds_docker_state_access_with_the_grant, test_claude_docker_grant_makes_config_writable, test_probe_uses_buildx_fallback_only_for_docker_state_write_failures (configured-test) pass in the targeted test_executors.py run; configured-test not verified; REV-004 is a defect within AC-2's scope
AC-3 test_probe_keeps_build_failure_cause_when_buildx_fallback_fails, test_probe_keeps_a_project_buildx_config_on_state_write_failure (configured-test) pass in the targeted run; configured-test not verified
AC-4 test_codex_dispatch_only_adds_docker_state_access_with_the_grant, test_codex_docker_grant_preserves_project_state_paths (configured-test) pass in the targeted run; configured-test not verified
AC-5 host-permissions.md, routing.md, PA-47 rows in capability-parity-audit.md pass by inspection

Verification (executed in the review clone at 79079d5)

Check Command Result
configured-test python3 -m unittest discover -s tests unverified: the run passed the 600 s foreground limit, moved to the background, and the harness stopped it at its background limit (about 20 minutes in total). No E or F marker appeared before it stopped. Earlier runs of this suite took 624–637 s. This run was slowed because the other checks ran alongside it
verify:test-executors python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_executors.py" exit 0, Ran 205 tests in 15.443s, OK
verify:test-grants python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_grants.py" exit 0, Ran 23 tests in 0.023s, OK
verify:validate-package python3 scripts/validate-package.py exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)…
verify:unittest python3 -m unittest exit 0, Ran 0 tests
verify:basedpyright basedpyright exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes

Security triage and audit

The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secrets or agent-configuration paths changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit runs anyway, because the plan marks it security_required and the change widens a sandbox grant's filesystem scope. cc-security-review ran on 79079d5.

  • No confirmed vulnerability.
  • Informational: the bound refuses only $HOME and its ancestors. A DOCKER_CONFIG pointing at a sibling such as ~/.ssh or ~/.config would still become writable. That precondition is the user's own environment.
  • Informational: the persistent ~/.docker writes (cli-plugins/, credsStore, contexts) can leave code that the host Docker CLI runs later. The owner decided this scope, and scripts/grants.py discloses it. The Docker socket is already root-equivalent.
  • Symlinks are resolved before the bound check. TOML -c values are JSON-quoted, and the argv lists are not shell-interpreted. No injection path found.

CI (head 79079d5, read once under the parallel policy)

Run 44285526567.

Check Required State
Classify the change no pass
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer yes pass
Windows test shard (windows-1) no pass
Windows test shard (windows-2) no pass
Windows test shard (windows-3) no pass
Windows test shard (windows-4) no fail
PowerShell installer yes fail

The cycle's CI gate decides what to do about the failures. Their logs were not read: gh run view is outside this stage's command table.

History

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED for e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3.

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

The resolver marked REV-001, REV-002 and REV-003 as valid and resolved in 79079d5.

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datacas commented Nov 18, 2026 •

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[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

Resolve update — PARTIALLY_RESOLVED. REV-004 and REV-005 are resolved by f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61; REV-001/002/003 remain resolved. The full suite ran 2,651 tests (1 skipped); validator, BasedPyright and focused executor tests passed. Security audit ran; no confirmed vulnerabilities. AC-1 remains open: the Codex probe could not launch docker (No such file or directory), so live builds are unverified. Checks on f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61: 0 passed, 0 failed, 2 pending.

Findings, verification, security, CI and history

Findings

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

Unsafe DOCKER_CONFIG now withholds the Docker write rule and Codex environment override while preserving the inherited value; Codex and Claude dispatch continue. The focused executor suite covers both adapters and the probe retains the refusal as not_verified. Fixed in f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

The test now patches Path.home and uses a temporary .docker directory and DOCKER_CONFIG. The full suite passes. Fixed in f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61.

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

The earlier fix updates docs/configuration.md with persistent DOCKER_CONFIG writes, the path bound and the build probe. Fixed in 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

The shared resolver normalizes the environment, probe and Codex/Claude write rules; tests cover home-relative and relative paths. Fixed in 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

The shared resolver refuses the home directory and its ancestors; documentation and tests cover the bound. Fixed in 79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be.

Acceptance criteria

  • AC-1 — open: the runtime probe attempted docker version in the Codex sandbox and failed before Docker ran: Failed to execvp docker: No such file or directory (os error 2). The live docker build and docker compose build checks did not run.
  • AC-2/AC-3/AC-4 — covered by the passing executor regression suite and full configured test suite.
  • AC-5 — documented in docs/host-permissions.md, docs/routing.md, and PA-47 in docs/capability-parity-audit.md.

Verification (agent-reported)

The stage's version-2 check results follow. configured-test retains its frozen owner (codex / cheap_coder). AC-1 stays unverified; the prerequisite probe is evidence, not a Docker build result.

{
  "version": 2,
  "conclusion": "not_verified",
  "boundary": "required",
  "checks": [
    {
      "id": "configured-test",
      "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests",
      "executor": "codex",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": [],
      "level": "test",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [{"exit_code": 130, "note": "Stopped and rerun after the final source edit."}],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": 2651}]
    },
    {
      "id": "verify:validate-package",
      "command": "python3 scripts/validate-package.py",
      "executor": "claude",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": [],
      "level": "static",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
    },
    {
      "id": "verify:unittest",
      "command": "python3 -m unittest",
      "executor": "claude",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": [],
      "level": "test",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": 0}]
    },
    {
      "id": "verify:basedpyright",
      "command": "basedpyright",
      "executor": "claude",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": [],
      "level": "static",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
    },
    {
      "id": "verify:test-executors",
      "command": "rtk python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py",
      "executor": "claude",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": ["AC-2", "AC-3", "AC-4"],
      "level": "test",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime acceptance regression coverage",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [{"exit_code": 1, "note": "Initial test setup passed sandbox_grants to ClaudeAdapter; corrected and rerun."}],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": 206}]
    },
    {
      "id": "verify:docker-docs",
      "command": "rtk rg -n \"docker_host|DOCKER_CONFIG|PA-47|home directory|build-state|Buildx\" docs/host-permissions.md docs/routing.md docs/capability-parity-audit.md",
      "executor": "claude",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": ["AC-5"],
      "level": "static",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime acceptance documentation check",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
    },
    {
      "id": "verify:diff-check",
      "command": "rtk git diff --check",
      "executor": "claude",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "project",
      "required": false,
      "criteria": [],
      "level": "static",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "additional diff check",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "pass",
      "cause": "",
      "attempts": [],
      "evidence": [{"exit_code": 0, "executed": null}]
    },
    {
      "id": "docker-host-boundary",
      "command": "docker build and docker compose build in the granted Codex stage sandbox",
      "executor": "codex",
      "profile": "cheap_coder",
      "context": "sandbox",
      "required": true,
      "criteria": ["AC-1"],
      "level": "boundary",
      "provenance": "runtime",
      "reason": "runtime acceptance boundary check",
      "head_sha": "f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61",
      "result": "unverified",
      "cause": "The Codex sandbox probe could not exec docker: No such file or directory (os error 2); neither live build ran.",
      "attempts": [{"command": "docker version", "executor": "codex", "exit_code": 101, "error": "Failed to execvp docker: No such file or directory (os error 2)."}],
      "evidence": [{"command": "docker version", "exit_code": 101, "executed": null}]
    }
  ]
}

The full suite ran 2,651 tests, 1 skipped; the package validator passed; basedpyright reported 0 errors, warnings or notes; the default unittest command ran 0 tests and exited 0. The executor suite ran 206 tests and passed. The initial interrupted full-suite attempt and the first focused-test setup error are retained under attempts; final checks were rerun after correcting the source/test changes.

Post-change review

The accumulated diff was reviewed against origin/main because no trusted delta base was recovered. The delegated review found no additional actionable findings.

Security audit

cc-security-review ran as required. No confirmed vulnerabilities found. The unsafe path is canonicalized before the bound check; it adds neither a write grant nor an explicit Codex DOCKER_CONFIG setting. Paths passed to the process are JSON-quoted argv/config values, not shell text. Residual risk: the explicitly granted Docker daemon remains host-root capable and the Linux socket grant opens every reachable Unix socket; the documented consent names both scopes.

Checks of pushed head

Read once for f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61: Classify the change queued; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer queued. Counts: 0 passed, 0 failed, 2 pending. Parallel CI policy applies; no wait or fix round was run.

History

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

[REV-001] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

[REV-002] · low · open · - · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

[REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

[REV-004] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

[REV-005] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI for head f6d6df6. Full diff 54a83ad...f6d6df6 rereviewed (9 files). No open finding blocks.

  • REV-004 resolved: all 4 resolver call sites catch the refusal and drop only the Docker write and override. test_refused_docker_config_does_not_prevent_native_dispatch passes.
  • REV-005 resolved: the test patches Path.home and DOCKER_CONFIG, so it no longer reads the host's ~/.docker. Passes.
  • REV-006 (low, new): the Claude probe always grants write on DOCKER_CONFIG, but the Claude dispatch grants it only when the directory exists. Fix: apply the same is_dir() rule. Test: probe without ~/.docker.

Unchanged: REV-001..003 stay resolved. Local checks: configured-test passed (2651 OK, 1 skipped), plus validator, basedpyright and 15 Docker regression tests. AC-1 not verified. Security audit ran: no confirmed vulnerability. CI: 5 passed, 2 failed, including the required PowerShell installer check. The CI gate decides.

Findings, verification, security, CI and history

Findings

[REV-006] · low · open · - · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not

Path: scripts/executors.py:747; compare scripts/executors.py:773 (Codex probe), :2366 (Codex dispatch) and :3234 (Claude dispatch).

The Claude probe adds str(docker_config_path) to allowWrite unconditionally. The other three places add the rule only when docker_config_path.is_dir().

When DOCKER_CONFIG (default ~/.docker) does not exist yet, the Claude probe and the Claude stage therefore run under different filesystem rules. If srt honours a write rule on a missing path, the probe can report verified while the stage cannot create the directory.

How srt handles a missing path was not observed here, so the consequence is inferred. The drift itself is in the code. Suggested fix: use the same is_dir() condition in the Claude probe, or create the directory before both the probe and the dispatch. Add a probe test with a missing DOCKER_CONFIG.

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

All four _effective_docker_config_path call sites now handle the refusal: executors.py:204, :697 (probe returns not_verified), :2363 and :3231. The git grep found no other caller. With a refused path, no write rule and no DOCKER_CONFIG override are added, and the inherited value is kept. Verified by test_refused_docker_config_does_not_prevent_native_dispatch, which covers Codex and Claude: both launch, with no home write rule.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

test_a_granted_publishing_review_keeps_docker_state_and_scratch_grants now uses a temporary home, .docker and DOCKER_CONFIG. It passed in a targeted run and in the full suite.

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

Unchanged since 79079d5; still resolved at f6d6df6.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

Unchanged; test_docker_config_resolution_matches_dispatch_and_probe passes. REV-006 is a narrower drift that this fix did not cover.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

Unchanged; test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent passes.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 live docker build / docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox not verified. The runtime probe in this Claude stage found no docker (docker: command not found, exit 127). codex sandbox cannot start inside a stage (the nested-Codex limitation)
AC-2 verify:docker-regressions pass
AC-3 verify:docker-regressions (test_probe_keeps_build_failure_cause_when_buildx_fallback_fails, test_failed_probe_is_forwarded_without_changing_executor_or_stopping) pass
AC-4 verify:docker-regressions (test_codex_dispatch_only_adds_docker_state_access_with_the_grant, test_claude_docker_grant_makes_config_writable) pass
AC-5 docs-acceptance-review: host-permissions.md, routing.md, PA-47 in capability-parity-audit.md (and configuration.md) pass by inspection

Verification (executed in the review clone at f6d6df6)

Check Command Result
configured-test python3 -m unittest discover -s tests exit 0, Ran 2651 tests in 422.420s, OK (skipped=1)
verify:validate-package python3 scripts/validate-package.py exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)…
verify:unittest python3 -m unittest exit 0, Ran 0 tests
verify:basedpyright basedpyright exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes
verify:docker-regressions python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -v -k DockerHostProbeTests -k docker_state -k claude_docker_grant exit 0, Ran 15 tests, OK
docker-host-boundary live Docker builds in the granted Codex sandbox unverified, see AC-1

A first targeted run with dotted module names failed to import (No module named 'test_support'). That was an invocation error, not a test failure; the discovery form above is the valid run.

Security triage and audit

The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secrets or agent-configuration paths changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit runs anyway, because the plan marks it security_required and the change widens a sandbox grant's filesystem scope. cc-security-review ran on f6d6df6, focused on the fix delta 79079d5..f6d6df6 (scripts/executors.py, tests/test_executors.py).

  • No confirmed vulnerability.
  • The REV-004 fix keeps the inherited DOCKER_CONFIG but grants no write to it, so a refused path widens nothing.
  • Informational, unchanged: a DOCKER_CONFIG that points at a sibling of home, such as ~/.config, still becomes writable. Persistent ~/.docker writes (cli-plugins/, credsStore, contexts) can leave code that the host Docker CLI runs later. The owner decided this scope, and the grant text discloses it.
  • TOML -c values are JSON-quoted, and the argv lists are not shell-interpreted. No injection path found.

CI (head f6d6df6, read once under the parallel policy)

Run 44331323776.

Check Required State
Classify the change no pass
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer yes pass
Windows test shard (windows-1) no pass
Windows test shard (windows-2) no pass
Windows test shard (windows-3) no pass
Windows test shard (windows-4) no fail
PowerShell installer yes fail

The same two checks also failed on e17bc9a and 79079d5. The cycle's CI gate decides what to do about them.

History

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: BLOCKED for 79079d5. REV-004 and REV-005 were opened.

[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

The resolver marked REV-004 and REV-005 as valid and resolved in f6d6df6.

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026 •

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[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2

Round summary

  • Failed check run 44331323776: fixed all five Windows path failures. Tilde paths now use the resolved home, and path assertions compare canonical paths.
  • REV-006 (low, valid, blocks:no): fixed the Claude probe to match dispatch when DOCKER_CONFIG does not exist; regression test passes. REV-001–005 remain resolved.

Status: PARTIALLY_RESOLVED. Local checks pass. AC-1 remains unverified because this executor cannot find the docker executable.

Findings, verification, security, CI and history

Findings

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

docs/configuration.md:121. The key documents that true pre-authorizes persistent DOCKER_CONFIG writes, including the default ~/.docker, and refuses paths containing the home directory.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

scripts/executors.py. ~/ now resolves from Path.home() on Windows as well as POSIX, and the dispatch environment, probe and write rule use the same canonical path. The full suite passed.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

scripts/executors.py. The effective path is refused when equal to or above the user's home directory; regression tests passed.

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

Unsafe paths withhold only Docker's filesystem grant; Codex and Claude dispatch continue without the override. Regression test passed.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

The test uses a temporary home and Docker config. Full suite passed.

[REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not

The Claude probe now adds the Docker config path only when it is a directory, matching dispatch behavior. Added test_claude_probe_does_not_grant_a_missing_docker_config; the Docker probe regression set passed (14 tests).

Verification (agent-reported)

Check Command Result
configured-test python3 -m unittest discover -s tests pass, 2,652 tests, 1 skipped
docker-grant-regressions python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests pass, 14 tests
validate-package python3 scripts/validate-package.py pass
unittest-default python3 -m unittest pass, 0 tests collected
basedpyright basedpyright pass, 0 errors, warnings or notes
diff-check git diff --check pass
docker-host-boundary live Docker build and compose build in the granted Codex sandbox not verified: the runtime probe failed to exec docker (No such file or directory); Docker-dependent commands were not run
docs-acceptance-review inspect docs/host-permissions.md, docs/routing.md, docs/capability-parity-audit.md pass; the three pages document Docker state writes, the build probe and PA-47

Agent-reported verification checks, schema 2:

{"version":2,"checks":[{"id":"configured-test","command":"python3 -m unittest discover -s tests","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"test","provenance":"runtime","reason":"runtime","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":2652},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"docker-grant-regressions","command":"python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-2","AC-3","AC-4"],"level":"test","provenance":"runtime","reason":"AC-linked Docker regression coverage","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":14},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"package-validator","command":"python3 scripts/validate-package.py","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"static","provenance":"project","reason":"configured package validator","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"default-unittest","command":"python3 -m unittest","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"test","provenance":"project","reason":"configured default unittest command","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":0},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"basedpyright","command":"basedpyright","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"static","provenance":"project","reason":"configured type check","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"diff-check","command":"rtk git diff f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61..HEAD --check","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":[],"level":"static","provenance":"agent","reason":"fix-delta whitespace check","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"docs-acceptance-review","command":"rtk rg -n \"docker_host|DOCKER_CONFIG|Buildx|buildx|PA-47\" docs/host-permissions.md docs/routing.md docs/capability-parity-audit.md","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-5"],"level":"static","provenance":"runtime","reason":"AC-linked documentation coverage","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"pass","evidence":{"exit_code":0,"executed":null},"cause":"","attempts":[]},{"id":"docker-host-boundary","command":"docker build and docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox","executor":"codex","profile":"cheap_coder","context":"project","required":true,"criteria":["AC-1"],"level":"boundary","provenance":"runtime","reason":"runtime Docker boundary check","head_sha":"eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e","result":"unverified","evidence":[],"cause":"The Docker executable is unavailable: the stage sandbox probe failed to exec docker (No such file or directory).","attempts":[{"command":"docker version","exit_code":101,"error":"Failed to execvp docker: No such file or directory (os error 2)"}]}]}

Security and fix-delta review

cc-security-review ran as required (security_audit_ran=true); no confirmed vulnerability was found. The effective Docker config path remains bounded away from the home tree, configured Buildx state is preserved, and the retry uses only dispatch scratch when BUILDX_CONFIG is unset. The disclosed Docker grant remains host-root capable and writes persist by design.

The delegated cc-code-review pass found no P0–P3 issues in f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61..eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e. It noted that Windows path behavior still awaits the Windows CI rerun.

CI of pushed head

Head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e: 0 passed, 0 failed, 2 pending when read once under the parallel policy.

Check State
Classify the change pending
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer pending

The previous PowerShell installer failure came from the five Windows assertions listed above, not infrastructure. The CI gate will handle the new head's pending checks separately from review findings.

Run history

[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

Prior review finding: REV-006 was open at f6d6df6; triaged as valid and resolved in this attempt. REV-001–005 retain their prior valid/resolved dispositions.

Previous rereview receipt:

Current resolve receipt:

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: APPROVED for head eac57a3. The full diff 54a83ad...eac57a3 (9 files) was rereviewed. No finding is open.

  • REV-006 resolved: the Claude probe adds DOCKER_CONFIG to allowWrite only when it is a directory, the same rule the dispatch uses. test_claude_probe_does_not_grant_a_missing_docker_config passes.
  • Fix delta f6d6df6..eac57a3: ~/ and ~\ now resolve from Path.home(). Tests compare resolved paths. No regression found.

REV-001..005 are unchanged and stay resolved. Local checks passed: configured-test (2652 OK, 1 skipped), 14 Docker regressions, the validator and basedpyright. The security audit ran and found no confirmed vulnerability. CI: 7/7 checks passed. AC-1 is not verified: this stage cannot reach docker, so the verification conclusion is not_verified.

Findings, verification, security, CI and history

Findings

[REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not

scripts/executors.py:754-756: writable = [cwd, str(probe_directory)], and docker_config_path is appended only when is_dir(). The other three places use the same rule: the Codex probe (:782), the Codex dispatch (:2375) and the Claude dispatch (:3243). It is verified by executing test_claude_probe_does_not_grant_a_missing_docker_config in DockerHostProbeTests (14 tests OK).

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

Unchanged since 79079d5; docs/configuration.md:121 still discloses the writes, the bound and the build probe.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

_effective_docker_config_path is still the only resolver. Its new ~/ and ~\ branches feed the env, the probe and both write rules equally. test_docker_config_resolution_matches_dispatch_and_probe passes.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

Unchanged. The bound check still runs after resolve(). test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent passes.

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

Unchanged. test_refused_docker_config_does_not_prevent_native_dispatch passes.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

Unchanged. The test now asserts on the resolved temporary path, and it passes.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 docker-host-boundary not verified. The runtime probe in this Claude stage got docker: command not found (exit 127), and codex sandbox cannot start inside a stage (the nested-Codex limitation)
AC-2 docker-grant-regressions, configured-test pass
AC-3 docker-grant-regressions pass
AC-4 docker-grant-regressions pass
AC-5 docs-acceptance-review pass. The frozen rg command was refused by the stage table; the git grep equivalent found matches in all three pages (6, 9 and 7).

Verification (executed in the review clone at eac57a3)

Check Command Result
configured-test python3 -m unittest discover -s tests exit 0, Ran 2652 tests in 386.911s, OK (skipped=1)
docker-grant-regressions python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests exit 0, Ran 14 tests, OK
package-validator python3 scripts/validate-package.py exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)…
default-unittest python3 -m unittest exit 0, Ran 0 tests
basedpyright basedpyright exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes
diff-check rtk git diff f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61..HEAD --check exit 0, no output
docs-acceptance-review git grep -n -c -e docker_host -e DOCKER_CONFIG -e Buildx -e buildx -e PA-47 -- <3 pages> exit 0. The frozen rtk rg form was refused (rg is not in the rereview table)
docker-host-boundary live docker build / docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox unverified, see AC-1

Security triage and audit

The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secret or agent-configuration path changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit ran anyway because the plan marks it security_required. cc-security-review ran on eac57a3, focused on the delta f6d6df6..eac57a3.

  • No confirmed vulnerability.
  • The REV-006 fix narrows the Claude probe's write set. It widens nothing.
  • Informational: ~/ is now joined to the home path with pathlib. An input such as DOCKER_CONFIG=~//x therefore resolves to /x, where expanduser gave <home>/x. The env and the write rule still agree on that path, and the user's own environment could name it directly, so the grant gains no new exposure.
  • Informational, unchanged: a DOCKER_CONFIG that points at a sibling of home, such as ~/.config, still becomes writable. The persistent ~/.docker writes are disclosed in the grant text. The Docker socket is root-equivalent.

CI (head eac57a3, run 44343836377, read under the parallel policy)

Check State
Classify the change pass
Skills, manifests, and Bash installer pass
Windows test shard (windows-1) pass
Windows test shard (windows-2) pass
Windows test shard (windows-3) pass
Windows test shard (windows-4) pass
PowerShell installer pass

The windows-4 and PowerShell installer checks that failed on earlier heads now pass.

History

[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI for f6d6df6. REV-006 was opened.

[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2

The resolver marked REV-006 valid and resolved in eac57a3.

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCR-20261118-005] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: APPROVED for head eac57a3. The head is unchanged since CCR-20261118-004. This rereview covered the full accumulated diff again (54a83ad...eac57a3, 9 files, 893 lines).

  • No finding changed. All 6 findings (REV-001..006) remain resolved, and their tests pass again.
  • No new finding.
  • Local checks pass: configured-test (2652 OK, 1 skipped), 14 Docker regressions, validator, basedpyright and diff-check. The security audit ran and found no confirmed vulnerability. CI: 7/7 passed.
  • AC-1 (docker-host-boundary) is still not verified. This Claude dispatch has no docker_host grant, and the check belongs to a granted Codex sandbox. The verification conclusion stays not_verified.
Findings, verification, security, CI and history

Findings

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

docs/configuration.md:121 discloses the DOCKER_CONFIG writes (~/.docker by default) and the home-directory bound. It also documents the docker build probe. Unchanged since the last round.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

_effective_docker_config_path is the only resolver. The env, the probe and both write rules use it. test_docker_config_resolution_matches_dispatch_and_probe passes.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

The bound runs after resolve(). test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent passes.

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

test_refused_docker_config_does_not_prevent_native_dispatch passes for Codex and Claude.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

The test uses a temporary home and a temporary Docker config, and it passes.

[REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not

The Claude probe adds DOCKER_CONFIG to allowWrite only when it is a directory, the same rule as the dispatch. test_claude_probe_does_not_grant_a_missing_docker_config passes.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 docker-host-boundary not verified. The toolkit hook refused docker version because this dispatch lacks docker_host. The check runs in a granted Codex sandbox, and a Claude grant would not cover it.
AC-2 docker-grant-regressions pass
AC-3 docker-grant-regressions pass (test_probe_keeps_build_failure_cause_when_buildx_fallback_fails)
AC-4 docker-grant-regressions pass (Codex granted and ungranted cases; Claude policy_files with and without the grant)
AC-5 docs-acceptance-review pass. git grep finds matches in all three pages (host-permissions 10, routing 7, capability-parity-audit 6), and PA-47 rows are present.

Verification (executed in the review clone at eac57a3)

Check Command Result
configured-test python3 -m unittest discover -s tests exit 0, Ran 2652 tests in 484.215s, OK (skipped=1)
docker-grant-regressions python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_executors.py -k DockerHostProbeTests exit 0, Ran 14 tests, OK
package-validator python3 scripts/validate-package.py exit 0, VALID: 16 skills (7 cycle, 9 supporting)…
default-unittest python3 -m unittest exit 0, Ran 0 tests
basedpyright basedpyright exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes
diff-check git diff --check 54a83ad HEAD (stands in for the hashed frozen command) exit 0, no output
docs-acceptance-review git grep -n -c … -- <3 pages> plus a read of the docs diff exit 0
docker-host-boundary live docker build and docker compose build in the granted Codex sandbox unverified (see AC-1)

Security triage and audit

The deterministic rule did not fire: no CI, secret or agent-configuration path changed, and the PR has no labels. The audit ran anyway because the plan marks it security_required. cc-security-review ran on eac57a3 over the full diff.

  • No confirmed vulnerability.
  • Codex -c values are built with json.dumps, and every probe and dispatch argv is a list without a shell. The probe tag comes from mkdtemp.
  • Changing the disclosure text also changes the grant fingerprint: SensitiveGrant.fingerprint hashes scope.effective (scripts/grants.py:103). An earlier persistent docker_host answer therefore becomes UNKNOWN and is asked again, as the docs state.
  • Informational, unchanged: a DOCKER_CONFIG the user sets to a sibling path under home, such as ~/.config, becomes writable. Only os.environ is read, not project files. The Docker socket is root-equivalent, and the grant text discloses this.

CI (head eac57a3, run 44343836377, read once under the parallel policy)

All 7 checks passed: Classify the change; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer; Windows test shards 1–4; and PowerShell installer.

History

[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: APPROVED for eac57a3. REV-006 resolved.

[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCT-20261118-004] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e · schema:2

Round summary: all 6 findings remain resolved; no finding status or disposition changed. The configured suite (2,652 tests, 1 skipped), 14 Docker regressions, validator, default unittest, BasedPyright and diff check passed. AC-1 remains unverified because this resolve dispatch is Claude, while the frozen boundary check requires the granted Codex sandbox. CI on eac57a3 is 7/7 passing.

Findings, criteria, verification and history

Findings

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

docs/configuration.md documents persistent DOCKER_CONFIG writes, the home-directory bound and the Docker build probe. The prior rereview found the finding resolved; unchanged this round.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

_effective_docker_config_path is the shared resolver for the environment, probe and write rules. test_docker_config_resolution_matches_dispatch_and_probe passed in the prior rereview; unchanged this round.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

The bound runs after resolve(). test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent passed in the prior rereview; unchanged this round.

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

test_refused_docker_config_does_not_prevent_native_dispatch passed for Codex and Claude in the prior rereview; unchanged this round.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

The regression test uses a temporary home and Docker config. It passed in the prior rereview; unchanged this round.

[REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not

The probe only grants DOCKER_CONFIG when the directory exists, matching dispatch. test_claude_probe_does_not_grant_a_missing_docker_config passed in the prior rereview; unchanged this round.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 docker-host-boundary Not verified. This dispatch is Claude; the frozen check requires execution in the granted Codex sandbox.
AC-2 docker-grant-regressions Pass; sandbox grant path is covered by regression tests.
AC-3 docker-grant-regressions Pass; the regression verifies the real Buildx fallback failure cause.
AC-4 docker-grant-regressions Pass; granted and ungranted Codex dispatch profiles are covered.
AC-5 docs-acceptance-review Pass; all three required documentation pages contain the scoped behavior and PA-47.

Verification (agent-reported, head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e)

Check Result
configured-test Pass: 2,652 tests, 1 skipped.
docker-grant-regressions Pass: 14 tests.
package-validator Pass: 16 skills; shared sections and manifests aligned.
default-unittest Pass: 0 tests collected.
basedpyright Pass: 0 errors, warnings or notes.
diff-check Pass: git diff --check against 54a83ad79d761b50a5bac9ad1d3ebcfdaeeedce5.
docs-acceptance-review Pass: documentation search and review of the supplied diff.
docker-host-boundary Not verified: no Codex dispatch was available in this resolve stage.

The supplied accumulated diff was 893 lines and matched SHA-256 4c2d99549e5fa74bd2b315f26c14f7f3ef2a8a9997ef59d8f285850e88e8bfca. The latest trusted review head is the current head, so the fix delta is empty. No security audit was required by this plan (security_required=false).

CI (head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e)

All 7 checks passed: Classify the change; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer; Windows test shards 1–4; and PowerShell installer.

History

[CCR-20261118-005] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

@datacas

datacas commented Nov 18, 2026

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[CCR-20261118-006] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

Verdict: APPROVED for head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e. I re-reviewed the full accumulated diff (893 lines, SHA-256 matches) and found no new findings. All 6 earlier findings are still resolved and none changed. All 7 CI checks pass. Six of the seven local checks I could run pass. The security audit ran and found no confirmed vulnerability.

AC-1 (docker-host-boundary) is still unverified. The check has to run in a Codex sandbox that holds the docker_host grant. This dispatch is Claude without that grant, and the hook refused docker version (rule docker_host).

Findings, criteria, verification, security, CI and history

Findings (unchanged this round)

[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — configuration.md does not disclose the wider scope that docker.host_socket_access pre-authorizes

docs/configuration.md states that the grant persists writes to DOCKER_CONFIG, refuses a path at or above home, and runs the build probe. Still resolved.

[REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — DOCKER_CONFIG is resolved inconsistently across the probe, the env and the write rules

_effective_docker_config_path is the single resolver. test_docker_config_resolution_matches_dispatch_and_probe passed again in this run.

[REV-003] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the DOCKER_CONFIG write grant has no bound

The bound is applied after resolve(). test_docker_config_cannot_grant_home_or_its_parent passed again.

[REV-004] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — a refused DOCKER_CONFIG fails the whole stage instead of only Docker checks

test_refused_docker_config_does_not_prevent_native_dispatch passed again for both Codex and Claude.

[REV-005] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the publishing-review Docker test depends on the host's ~/.docker

The test uses a temporary home and Docker config, and passed again.

[REV-006] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — the Claude Docker probe grants a write the Claude dispatch does not

The probe grants DOCKER_CONFIG only when the directory exists. test_claude_probe_does_not_grant_a_missing_docker_config passed again.

Acceptance criteria

AC Check Result
AC-1 docker-host-boundary unverified: this is a Claude dispatch without docker_host, and docker version was refused ([layer=toolkit_hook], rule docker_host). The check needs the granted Codex sandbox.
AC-2 docker-grant-regressions pass
AC-3 docker-grant-regressions pass: if the Buildx fallback fails, the probe keeps the original cause
AC-4 docker-grant-regressions pass: covers the Codex profile and environment both with and without the grant
AC-5 docs-acceptance-review pass: host-permissions.md, routing.md and the PA-47 rows describe the behaviour

Verification (agent-reported, head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e)

Check Result
configured-test pass: exit 0, 2,652 tests run, 1 skipped
docker-grant-regressions pass: exit 0, 14 tests
package-validator pass: exit 0, VALID: 16 skills
default-unittest pass: exit 0, 0 tests collected
basedpyright pass: exit 0, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 notes
diff-check pass: git diff --check against the merge base exited 0
docs-acceptance-review pass: reviewed the doc hunks in the supplied diff
docker-host-boundary unverified: Docker refused in this dispatch (see AC-1)

Overall verification result: not_verified, because one required check could not run.

Security

Security audit ran (security_required). No confirmed vulnerability. Reviewed:

  • the DOCKER_CONFIG resolver and its home bound;
  • the Codex filesystem and shell_environment_policy options, whose values are JSON-quoted;
  • the Claude allowWrite list;
  • the Buildx fallback, which stays in the per-dispatch TMPDIR;
  • the probe's build context, which holds only a fixed FROM scratch Dockerfile;
  • the grant disclosure. Its fingerprint includes the effective text, so earlier persistent consents are asked again.

Informational residual risks:

  • With the grant, writes to ~/.docker (CLI plugins, credential helpers) persist and can run later on the host. This is disclosed, needs consent, and Docker access is already root-equivalent.
  • The bound covers only home and its ancestors, not other home subdirectories. DOCKER_CONFIG comes only from the user's own launching environment; repository configuration cannot set it.

Not a sensitive path under the mandatory minimum. The audit ran because the plan requires it.

CI (head eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e, read once, parallel policy)

7/7 passed: Classify the change; Skills, manifests, and Bash installer; Windows test shards 1–4; PowerShell installer.

History

[CCT-20261118-004] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:eac57a3690f0bd5c7e89390c3b3432dd552b244e · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-005] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-003] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:f6d6df6b7fd747946ae1983d650f878cd1c73b61 · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-002] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:79079d53a0ead071de864e6b4ad768fa84f136be · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-002] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

[CCT-20261118-001] · cheap_coder · openai/gpt-6-luna→? · high · triaged:e17bc9a21975b63a496fcd81022b4b2b6e94a7b3 · schema:2

[CCR-20261118-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2

@datacas
datacas merged commit 87675a9 into main Nov 18, 2026
7 checks passed
@datacas
datacas deleted the fix/507-docker-host-state-dir branch November 18, 2026 19:41
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