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Implementation continuation IMPLEMENTED and uploaded to this existing PR. Confirmed GitHub head Verification — agent-reportedHead: The conclusion remains not_verified: the two frozen native boundary checks could not execute inside this Codex stage. The supplied host spike is retained as host-reported evidence on the preceding commit, never counted as a locally executed final-head check. AC-1, AC-4 and AC-5 retain these verification obligations; no criterion or required check was removed.
Version-2 check identities and evidence{
"version": 2,
"ran": true,
"conclusion": "not_verified",
"boundary": "required",
"checks": [
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "configured-test",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests",
"criteria": [
"AC-1",
"AC-2",
"AC-3",
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "test",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 2682
}
],
"cause": "",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests",
"result": "fail",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 1,
"executed": 2682
}
],
"cause": "Earlier continuation run: Docker-only receipt compatibility and a positional grant-list assertion failed. Both corrected; targeted reruns passed (6 characterization tests and 2 permission lifecycle tests). Final complete rerun passed at this head."
}
]
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "package-validation",
"command": "python3 scripts/validate-package.py",
"criteria": [
"AC-6"
],
"level": "static",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": null
}
],
"cause": "",
"attempts": []
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "default-unittest",
"command": "python3 -m unittest",
"criteria": [],
"level": "test",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 0
}
],
"cause": "",
"attempts": []
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "basedpyright",
"command": "basedpyright",
"criteria": [],
"level": "static",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": null
}
],
"cause": "",
"attempts": []
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "sandbox-grants",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py",
"criteria": [
"AC-2",
"AC-3",
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "boundary",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 17
}
],
"cause": "",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 13
}
],
"cause": "Earlier continuation before additional regression coverage."
},
{
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py",
"result": "fail",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 1,
"executed": 17
}
],
"cause": "Quoted-domain denial detection was missing; corrected."
},
{
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py",
"result": "fail",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 1,
"executed": 17
}
],
"cause": "Recording-adapter fixture did not dispatch under a read-only workspace policy; fixture corrected to isolate grant filtering from workspace enforcement."
}
]
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "sandbox",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "codex-socket-spike",
"command": "sha256:d8ada3eac090a7e6e29997d5fe2c40b1ebbbead19ac75c4009244853950a6a60",
"criteria": [
"AC-1"
],
"level": "boundary",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "unverified",
"evidence": [],
"cause": "Not executed locally: this Codex stage masks /tmp/codex-daemon-1000 with mode 000, so nested Codex cannot start. The supplied host report measured the preceding commit; it is not final-head local verification.",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "rtk proxy ls -ld /tmp/codex-daemon-1000",
"exit_code": 0,
"observed": "d--------- (mode 000); metadata only"
},
{
"action": "authorized recovery assessment",
"observed": "No host-capable execution or escalation is available. Runtime prohibits nested codex sandbox, codex exec and srt here; none was launched and isolation was not disabled."
}
]
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "sandbox",
"required": true,
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"id": "grant-recovery-boundary",
"command": "sha256:01891df0c68a7508f65f9e00af102961c4b966d0466947300646d6247b44c7aa",
"criteria": [
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "boundary",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "unverified",
"evidence": [],
"cause": "Not executed at the native sandbox boundary: nested Codex is unavailable in this stage. The 34 executed recovery regression tests exercise the runtime flow with fixture adapters and do not replace this required sandbox check.",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "rtk proxy ls -ld /tmp/codex-daemon-1000",
"exit_code": 0,
"observed": "d--------- (mode 000); metadata only"
},
{
"action": "authorized recovery assessment",
"observed": "No host-capable execution or escalation is available. Runtime prohibits nested codex sandbox, codex exec and srt here; none was launched and isolation was not disabled."
}
]
},
{
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"provenance": "agent",
"reason": "exercise observed-denial consent and guarded same-executor recovery",
"id": "recovery-regression",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_environment_recovery.py",
"criteria": [
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "test",
"head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 34
}
],
"cause": "",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_environment_recovery.py",
"result": "fail",
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 1,
"executed": 34
}
],
"cause": "Agent-only blocker fixture lacked a required recovery attempt; fixture corrected before passing reruns."
}
]
}
]
}Security review — agent-reportedRan cc-security-review. No confirmed vulnerability found in the accumulated change. Reviewed surface: canonical paths/domains and consent identities; protected stores, symlinks and ancestors; trusted denial sources and explicit definitions; writer/reviewer separation; Codex and Claude configuration emission; immutable Claude policy placement; guarded same-executor replay and decision records. Not reviewed by execution: native enforcement on this final head, because nested Codex is unavailable. The supplied host measurement is attributed separately. Residual risk: writable tool state persists and can affect later runs. Loopback TCP reaches local services; the host spike establishes that Docker's Unix socket and other AF_UNIX sockets remain closed in that profile. No claim of overall security or approval is made. Code-host checks — read onceHead:
Run: schema=2; profile=deep_coder; requested=openai/gpt-6.1-sol; effort=medium; resolved=? |
[CCR-20261119-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Initial review: CHANGES_REQUESTED at
Checks run locally: configured suite passed (2,682 tests; one unrelated flaky test failed on the first run and passed on rerun), plus package validation, default unittest and BasedPyright. Native boundary checks: not_verified. Security audit: ran. CI: 5 passed, 2 failed (reported, not findings). Findings, verification, security, CI and receiptFindings[REV-001] · medium · open · - · blocks:yes — Command output an agent controls is accepted as an observed sandbox denialPaths:
The user is still asked before any access is granted, and protected stores are still refused. The problem is that the agent picks the parameter while the record and the question present it as runtime-observed. This contradicts the #509 decision "Consent identity": the parameter comes from an observed sandbox denial or validated configuration, never from the agent's statement alone. It also contradicts the guarantee in Fix:
Evidence: code inspection. An execution repro helper was refused by this stage's write policy ( [REV-002] · low · open · - · blocks:no — Writable bounds accept agent-host configuration and shell startup pathsPath: The protected list covers credential stores and the toolkit's consent and journal stores. It does not cover:
A write grant on any of these lets a stage add hooks, permissions or code that runs outside the sandbox in later sessions. The docs give that same reason ("would let a stage forge authorization") for protecting the consent stores. The #509 bounds ("anywhere under $HOME except credential stores … and their ancestors") allow these paths, and the user approves the exact path, so this is a potential risk, not a confirmed vulnerability. Together with REV-001, an agent can steer the question toward one of them. Owner decision: add these paths to the protected set, or name the risk explicitly in the question for such paths. Acceptance criteria and checks (tests.version=2)Checks were frozen before running. AC-1…AC-6 follow the runtime list order, which matches #509's AC-1, AC-2, AC-2b, AC-3, AC-4 and AC-5.
Conclusion: Security triage and auditDeterministic rule: no match. The repository declares no Confirmed: none beyond REV-001 (a provenance/trust-boundary defect; it grants no access without consent). Potential: REV-002. Reviewed:
Not reviewed by execution: native Codex/Claude enforcement of the emitted profiles at this head. Residual risk:
CI (parallel policy, read once at
|
[CCT-20261119-001] · deep_coder · openai/gpt-6.1-sol→? · high · triaged:cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66 · schema:2RESOLVED — pushed
Finding records, verification, CI diagnosis and history[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — Command output an agent controls is accepted as an observed sandbox denialAt the triaged head, command stdout/stderr supplied Changes: [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — Writable bounds accept agent-host configuration and shell startup pathsThe owner-defined bounds in #509 allow exact non-credential home targets. The fix preserves those bounds and takes the review's disclosure option: every writable question warns, before the path, that persistent writes can alter agent hooks, permissions or shell startup code executed outside the sandbox in later sessions. Tests cover Claude settings/hooks, Codex config, .bashrc, .profile and .local/bin for writing and separate review scopes. Existing protected stores stay refused. Fix commit: Supplied CI failure — separate from review findingsReviewed-head check The upstream same-head Windows test shard (windows-4), job The fix accepts lexical or resolved HOME spelling while requiring the resolved target strictly below resolved HOME and checking both protected-store representations. Canonical grants survive consent/replay/dispatch. The temporary HOME fixture is resolved, and TOML path assertions use JSON escaping for Windows. The alias regression covers grant creation, token rebuild, consent, dispatch eligibility and protected-target rejection.
Verification — agent-reported, tests.version=2Checks were frozen before execution and retain the runtime's identities, owning executor/profile, required flags and AC-n links in the supplied order. Final configured suite: exit 0, 2,685 tests in 405.719 s, OK (skipped=1). Default unittest exits 0 but discovers 0 tests and supplies no coverage. Exploratory runs interrupted while fixing the fixture and CI defects are retained as attempts; they were not completed suites or timeouts. {
"version": 2,
"ran": true,
"passed": true,
"conclusion": "not_verified",
"boundary": "required",
"checks": [
{
"id": "configured-test",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [
"AC-1",
"AC-2",
"AC-3",
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "test",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [
{
"exit_code": 130,
"cause": "Interrupted an exploratory run after correcting the new fixture prompt callback."
},
{
"exit_code": 130,
"cause": "Interrupted an exploratory run when recovered Windows CI logs required a path-normalization fix."
},
{
"exit_code": 130,
"cause": "Interrupted an exploratory run after the delegated review corrected alias replay; final tree rerun passed."
}
],
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 2685
}
]
},
{
"id": "package-validation",
"command": "python3 scripts/validate-package.py",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [
"AC-6"
],
"level": "static",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": null
}
]
},
{
"id": "default-unittest",
"command": "python3 -m unittest",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [],
"level": "test",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 0
}
]
},
{
"id": "basedpyright",
"command": "basedpyright",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [],
"level": "static",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": null
}
]
},
{
"id": "sandbox-grants",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [
"AC-2",
"AC-3",
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "boundary",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [
{
"exit_code": 130,
"cause": "Interrupted the initial run whose fixture returned a path repeatedly to the permission question; corrected the fixture before the passing rerun."
}
],
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 20
}
]
},
{
"id": "codex-socket-spike",
"command": "sha256:d8ada3eac090a7e6e29997d5fe2c40b1ebbbead19ac75c4009244853950a6a60",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "sandbox",
"required": true,
"criteria": [
"AC-1"
],
"level": "boundary",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "unverified",
"cause": "Known nested Codex limitation: /tmp/codex-daemon-1000 is masked mode 000 (metadata confirmed). The runtime prohibits nested codex sandbox/exec or srt here; escalation is unavailable. The frozen command is supplied only as a hash. Earlier host evidence is not current-head local execution.",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "rtk proxy ls -ld /tmp/codex-daemon-1000",
"exit_code": 0,
"observation": "d--------- (mode 000); no nested executor launched"
}
],
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "grant-recovery-boundary",
"command": "sha256:01891df0c68a7508f65f9e00af102961c4b966d0466947300646d6247b44c7aa",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "sandbox",
"required": true,
"criteria": [
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "boundary",
"provenance": "runtime",
"reason": "runtime",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "unverified",
"cause": "Known nested Codex limitation: /tmp/codex-daemon-1000 is masked mode 000 (metadata confirmed). The runtime prohibits nested codex sandbox/exec or srt here; escalation is unavailable. The frozen command is supplied only as a hash. Earlier host evidence is not current-head local execution.",
"attempts": [
{
"command": "rtk proxy ls -ld /tmp/codex-daemon-1000",
"exit_code": 0,
"observation": "d--------- (mode 000); no nested executor launched"
}
],
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "recovery-regression",
"command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_environment_recovery.py",
"executor": "codex",
"profile": "deep_coder",
"context": "project",
"required": true,
"criteria": [
"AC-4",
"AC-5"
],
"level": "test",
"provenance": "agent",
"reason": "exercise observed-denial consent and guarded same-executor recovery",
"head_sha": "385081ab5f6811e8f79955713d68dfc7dadc46b2",
"result": "pass",
"cause": "",
"attempts": [],
"evidence": [
{
"exit_code": 0,
"executed": 34
}
]
}
]
}AC-1 remains open at the native boundary. Both frozen native checks expose command hashes and cannot run here: a metadata read confirms Local verification used Linux and its installed Python/BasedPyright. The failing Windows log used Python 3.15.2. Native Windows execution and native sandbox enforcement were not available locally; remote CI remains separate. Dependency preparation reported prepared, with no failed/incomplete setup item. Post-change review and securityDelegated
Owning documentation was updated in Pushed-head checks — one read, parallel policyHead:
No wait, polling or in-stage CI fix round. GitHub confirmed that PR #514's head equals the uploaded commit. The working tree is clean. Previous review run and stage receiptsBoth historical comments were provider-authenticated as [CCR-20261119-001] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2 |
[CCR-20261119-003] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Rereview: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI at
2 unchanged findings (REV-001, REV-002 resolved). Local checks: the configured suite passed (2,685 tests). Package validation, default unittest, BasedPyright, sandbox-grants (20) and recovery-regression (34) also pass. The 2 native boundary checks are still not_verified, so this is not APPROVED. Security audit: ran, nothing confirmed. CI: 7/7 passed. Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — Command output an agent controls is accepted as an observed sandbox denialNo change since CCR-20261119-002. [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — Writable bounds accept agent-host configuration and shell startup pathsNo change since CCR-20261119-002. Every writable question starts with the persistent host-execution risk, for both writer and review scopes. Verified again by execution: [REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — The journal store is protected only at its default locationPath: The protected list hard-codes Impact is limited. Fix: add Evidence: code inspection. An execution repro ( Full rereview of the accumulated diffThe head did not move, but the whole diff was read again. Beyond REV-003, no new defect:
Acceptance criteria and checks (tests.version=2, agent-reported)Checks were frozen before running, with the runtime's identities and owning executor/profile. This stage ran on Claude (
Conclusion: Security (cc-security-review ran on
|
[CCR-20261119-004] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Rereview: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI at 3 unchanged findings: REV-001 and REV-002 resolved; REV-003 (low, blocks:no) still open, since no commit touched Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — Command output an agent controls is accepted as an observed sandbox denialNo change. Verified again by execution at [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — Writable bounds accept agent-host configuration and shell startup pathsNo change. Verified again by execution: [REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — The journal store is protected only at its default locationPath: Full rereview of the accumulated diffRe-read in full; no new defect:
Acceptance criteria and checks (tests.version=2, agent-reported)Frozen with the runtime identities and owning executor/profile. This stage ran on Claude (
Conclusion: Security (cc-security-review ran on
|
[CCR-20261119-005] · senior_reviewer · anthropic/claude-opus-5-5→? · high · schema:2Rereview: REVIEW_PASSED_AWAITING_CI at 3 findings are unchanged: REV-001 and REV-002 are resolved. REV-003 (low, blocks:no) is still open because no commit changed Findings, verification, security, CI and historyFindings[REV-001] · medium · resolved · valid · blocks:yes — Command output an agent controls is accepted as an observed sandbox denialNo change. Verified again by execution at [REV-002] · low · resolved · valid · blocks:no — Writable bounds accept agent-host configuration and shell startup pathsNo change. Verified again by execution: [REV-003] · low · open · - · blocks:no — The journal store is protected only at its default locationPath: Still reproducible by inspection at the same head. Fix: add Full rereview of the accumulated diffI read the whole diff again and found no new defect:
Acceptance criteria and checks (tests.version=2, agent-reported)The checks were frozen before running, with the runtime's identities and owning executor/profile. This stage ran on Claude (
Conclusion: Security (cc-security-review ran on
|
Adds named and parameterized sandbox grants, canonical consent and guarded recovery while preserving existing Docker state access. Resumes the original commit and PR branch; no replacement PR was created.
Diagnosis
The baseline registry exposed only docker_host, so loopback checks and exact home-path/domain requests had no consent path. This feature request's proposed cause matches the source. The fix extends the shared registry, broker and adapters rather than adding a bypass per command. The invariant is that a canonical, user-authorized scope reaches only its intended executor and stage roles, while protected stores and real host limits remain enforced.
A defect reproduction is not applicable. The supplied host spike on Codex CLI 0.170.0 establishes the loopback-only choice and is preserved with its provenance. A fresh local native spike cannot run inside this stage. Related search covered linked work and open/recent items by sandbox/grant terms: #507's Docker state handling is preserved; #508's local-socket follow-up is addressed here; #291's sibling verifier and #457's other consent conversions remain separate scope.
Resulting behavior
Work units
Verification — agent-reported
Head:
cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66. The full configured suite passed 2,682 tests in 476.653 seconds, with one skipped. Package validation and BasedPyright pass; default unittest discovery exits 0 and runs zero tests. The focused grant suite passes 17 tests and recovery regressions pass 34.The conclusion remains not_verified: the two frozen native boundary checks could not execute inside this Codex stage. The supplied host spike is retained as host-reported evidence on the preceding commit, never counted as a locally executed final-head check. AC-1, AC-4 and AC-5 retain these verification obligations; no criterion or required check was removed.
configured-testpackage-validationdefault-unittestbasedpyrightsandbox-grantscodex-socket-spikegrant-recovery-boundaryrecovery-regressionVersion-2 check identities and evidence
{ "version": 2, "ran": true, "conclusion": "not_verified", "boundary": "required", "checks": [ { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "project", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "configured-test", "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests", "criteria": [ "AC-1", "AC-2", "AC-3", "AC-4", "AC-5" ], "level": "test", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": 2682 } ], "cause": "", "attempts": [ { "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests", "result": "fail", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 1, "executed": 2682 } ], "cause": "Earlier continuation run: Docker-only receipt compatibility and a positional grant-list assertion failed. Both corrected; targeted reruns passed (6 characterization tests and 2 permission lifecycle tests). Final complete rerun passed at this head." } ] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "project", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "package-validation", "command": "python3 scripts/validate-package.py", "criteria": [ "AC-6" ], "level": "static", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": null } ], "cause": "", "attempts": [] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "project", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "default-unittest", "command": "python3 -m unittest", "criteria": [], "level": "test", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": 0 } ], "cause": "", "attempts": [] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "project", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "basedpyright", "command": "basedpyright", "criteria": [], "level": "static", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": null } ], "cause": "", "attempts": [] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "project", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "sandbox-grants", "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py", "criteria": [ "AC-2", "AC-3", "AC-4", "AC-5" ], "level": "boundary", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": 17 } ], "cause": "", "attempts": [ { "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": 13 } ], "cause": "Earlier continuation before additional regression coverage." }, { "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py", "result": "fail", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 1, "executed": 17 } ], "cause": "Quoted-domain denial detection was missing; corrected." }, { "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_sandbox_grants.py", "result": "fail", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 1, "executed": 17 } ], "cause": "Recording-adapter fixture did not dispatch under a read-only workspace policy; fixture corrected to isolate grant filtering from workspace enforcement." } ] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "sandbox", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "codex-socket-spike", "command": "sha256:d8ada3eac090a7e6e29997d5fe2c40b1ebbbead19ac75c4009244853950a6a60", "criteria": [ "AC-1" ], "level": "boundary", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "unverified", "evidence": [], "cause": "Not executed locally: this Codex stage masks /tmp/codex-daemon-1000 with mode 000, so nested Codex cannot start. The supplied host report measured the preceding commit; it is not final-head local verification.", "attempts": [ { "command": "rtk proxy ls -ld /tmp/codex-daemon-1000", "exit_code": 0, "observed": "d--------- (mode 000); metadata only" }, { "action": "authorized recovery assessment", "observed": "No host-capable execution or escalation is available. Runtime prohibits nested codex sandbox, codex exec and srt here; none was launched and isolation was not disabled." } ] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "sandbox", "required": true, "provenance": "runtime", "reason": "runtime", "id": "grant-recovery-boundary", "command": "sha256:01891df0c68a7508f65f9e00af102961c4b966d0466947300646d6247b44c7aa", "criteria": [ "AC-4", "AC-5" ], "level": "boundary", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "unverified", "evidence": [], "cause": "Not executed at the native sandbox boundary: nested Codex is unavailable in this stage. The 34 executed recovery regression tests exercise the runtime flow with fixture adapters and do not replace this required sandbox check.", "attempts": [ { "command": "rtk proxy ls -ld /tmp/codex-daemon-1000", "exit_code": 0, "observed": "d--------- (mode 000); metadata only" }, { "action": "authorized recovery assessment", "observed": "No host-capable execution or escalation is available. Runtime prohibits nested codex sandbox, codex exec and srt here; none was launched and isolation was not disabled." } ] }, { "executor": "codex", "profile": "deep_coder", "context": "project", "required": true, "provenance": "agent", "reason": "exercise observed-denial consent and guarded same-executor recovery", "id": "recovery-regression", "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_environment_recovery.py", "criteria": [ "AC-4", "AC-5" ], "level": "test", "head_sha": "cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66", "result": "pass", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 0, "executed": 34 } ], "cause": "", "attempts": [ { "command": "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_environment_recovery.py", "result": "fail", "evidence": [ { "exit_code": 1, "executed": 34 } ], "cause": "Agent-only blocker fixture lacked a required recovery attempt; fixture corrected before passing reruns." } ] } ] }Security review — agent-reported
Ran cc-security-review. No confirmed vulnerability found in the accumulated change.
Reviewed surface: canonical paths/domains and consent identities; protected stores, symlinks and ancestors; trusted denial sources and explicit definitions; writer/reviewer separation; Codex and Claude configuration emission; immutable Claude policy placement; guarded same-executor replay and decision records.
Not reviewed by execution: native enforcement on this final head, because nested Codex is unavailable. The supplied host measurement is attributed separately.
Residual risk: writable tool state persists and can affect later runs. Loopback TCP reaches local services; the host spike establishes that Docker's Unix socket and other AF_UNIX sockets remain closed in that profile. No claim of overall security or approval is made.
Documentation
Visible behavior, configuration and stored fields are documented in docs/host-permissions.md and docs/routing.md. docs/capability-parity-audit.md classifies the boundaries. docs/research/local-sockets-509.md preserves the supplied host measurement separately from current-head local verification. No issue scope, milestone or priority was changed.
Local execution used the stage sandbox and installed Python/BasedPyright, with the same configured commands as CI. CI is separate evidence and has not been counted as local verification. This PR stays draft pending native boundary verification and review.
Code-host checks — read once
Head:
cfe2237a75baa426f8653610d246c988f1f9ef66. 0 passed, 0 failed, 2 pending. Parallel CI policy: no wait or polling.Run: schema=2; profile=deep_coder; requested=openai/gpt-6.1-sol; effort=medium; resolved=?
Refs #509.